Let\u27s Make a Deal: Waiving the Eighth Amendment By Selecting a Cruel and Unusual Punishment by Kirchmeier, Jeffrey
City University of New York (CUNY) 
CUNY Academic Works 
Publications and Research CUNY School of Law 
2000 
Let's Make a Deal: Waiving the Eighth Amendment By Selecting a 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Jeffrey Kirchmeier 
CUNY School of Law 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cl_pubs/268 
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu 
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). 
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu 
Let's Make a Deal: Waiving the Eighth Amendment
by Selecting a Cruel and Unusual Punishment
JEFFREY L. KIRCHMEIER"
"Of two evils, the least should be chosen."
-Cicero, De Oficiis. HI, 1.
"The clause seems to express a great deal of humanity,... but... it seems to have
no meaning in it."
-Mr. Livermore, opposing the
adoption of the Eighth Amendment, Con-
gressional Record, p. 225, cited in Weems
v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 369
(1910).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Benton, Louisiana, a 45-year-old former elected official and base-
ball coach who was accused of child molestation was given a choice. The
judge told the defendant that if he pleaded guilty he could choose between:
(1) a 45-year prison sentence or (2) castration and a 25-year sentence.
* Associate Professor of Law, City University of New York School of Law. J.D., Case lestern
Reserve Universit, School of Law 1989; B.A., Case Western Reserve Unlverstly, 1984. The author
thanks Professors Sidney Harring and Stephen Loffredo for comments on an earlier draft For re-
search assistance, he thanks Professor Julie Lim and his research assistants: Tma Bennrt, Poarthlra
Chhim, and Molly Graver.
1. See National/International: Molester Offered Choice of 45 Years or Castration, FORT WORH
STAR-TELEGRAM, Aug. 9, 1998, at 6, available In LEXIS, News Library, Fwstel File [hereinaftr
Molester Offered Choice].
2. See id The castration involved surgery to remove the defendant's testicles instead of "chemical
castration," which requires defendants to take chemicals to suppress their sex drive. See /d See also
Around the US.: Molester Castrated In Try to Avoid 100-Year Tenn, DALLAs MORNING NE',s, Jan.
21, 1998, at 16A, available in LEXIS, News Library, Dalnws File [hereinafter Molester Castrated]
(noting that a convicted child molester underwent voluntary castration, hoping the Illinois judge wuld
use that fact to give the defendant a lighter sentence); Linda Beckman, Comment, Ckzmlcal Castration:
Constitutional Issues of Due Process, Equal Protection, and Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 100 W.
VA. L. Ray. 853 (1998) (arguing that chemical castration is not a cruel and unusual punishment).
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In Virginia, a criminal defendant agreed to leave the state as part of a
plea bargain The deal was made even though the Supreme Court had
held that banishment is cruel and unusual punishment.4
In 1997, when Washington state's primary method of execution was
hanging and inmates could choose lethal injection, a 410-pound defendant
refused to choose lethal injection, thereby selecting hanging by default.!
He made that choice despite the fact he would likely be decapitated if
hanged.6 Previously, the Supreme Court indicated that beheading is a cruel
and unusual punishment!
In 1999 in Arizona, two German brothers each chose the gas chamber
over lethal injection for his method of execution, as their attorneys gam-
bled that the courts would find that execution by gas is cruel and unusual
punishment The gamble lost. Although the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit issued stays of execution and held that execution
by gas is cruel and unusual punishment,9 the United States Supreme Court
lifted the stays.'" Subsequently, once again the state gave each of the
brothers the choice of execution method, and the first brother chose lethal
injection and the second chose the gas chamber." Each was executed by
his chosen method."
Most people may only wonder at the difficulty of choosing one's own
punishment when those options involve mutilation, torture, death, or all
3. See Rutherford v. Blankenship, 468 F. Supp. 1357, 1360-61 (W.D. Vs. 1979) (holding that
condition of banishment as part of a plea bargain violates the Eighth Amendment); see also Dear Wing
Jung v. United States, 312 F.2d 73, 76 (9th Cir. 1962) (holding that banishment as a condition of sus-
pension of sentence violates either the Eighth Amendment or due process of law).
4. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958) (holding that a statute authorizing expatriation as a
punishment violates the Eighth Amendment).
5. See Howard Swindle & Dan Malone, Twists in the System: Administration of Capital Punish-
ment Marked by Inconsistencies, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 17, 1997, at Al, available In LEXIS,
News Library, Dalnws File.
6. See id. Washington's execution protocol provides calculations for the length of rope for defen-
dants weighing 120 to only 220 pounds. See id "An engineer estimated that Mr. Rupe could be exe-
cuted by a rope three feet, six inches long without fear of decapitation. But a biomechanical engineer
testified he couldn't predict what would happen with a shorter rope." Id.
7. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134-36 (1878).
8. See Jerry Nachtigal, Arizona Executes German Citizen by Lethal Injection, DAYTON DAILY
NEWS, Feb. 25, 1999, at 4A, available in LEXIS, News Library, Daydnw File. At the time, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had held that execution by gas was cruel and unusual
punishment. See Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301, 309 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that execution by lethal
gas under California protocol is cruel and unusual punishment), vacated and remanded, 519 U.S. 918
(1996) (remanding case in light of change in California's death penalty statute making lethal injection
the default method of execution), on remand, Fierro v. Terhune, 147 F3d 1158 (1998). In the case of
the German brothers, however, the United States Supreme Court indicated that the lethal gas claim was
waived. See Stewart v. LaGrand, 119 S. CL 1018, 1020 (1999).
9. See LaGrand v. Stewart, 173 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir.), rev'd, 119 S. CL 1018 (1999).
10. See Stewart v. LaGrand, 119 S. CL 1107 (1999); LaGrand, 119 S. Ct. at 1021.
11. See Roger Cohen, U.S. Execution of German Stirs Anger, N.Y. TIMES, March 5, 1999, at A14.
12. See id
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three. Generally, members of our society can take comfort in the fact that
they will not be subjected to cruel and unusual punishments because of
protections we are afforded by the Eighth Amendment. 3 However, the
cases discussed above raise the issue of whether a criminal defendant may
be subjected to a cruel and unusual punishment if the defendant chooses
that punishment over a constitutional punishment."
This Article addresses the question of whether the cloak of "choice"
can elevate an unconstitutional punishment to a constitutional one. Until
recently, some commentators assumed that certain punishments were un-
constitutional under all circumstances."5 However, the Supreme Court re-
cently indicated that an elected punishment may never be a cruel and un-
usual punishment. 6
This Article begins with a discussion of the Eighth Amendment, in-
cluding a discussion of the Supreme Court's analysis regarding what pun-
ishments are cruel and unusual. Next, this Article addresses areas where
the Court has allowed defendants to waive Eighth Amendment protections
in various contexts. Then, this Article discusses the Supreme Court and
lower court decisions that address whether one may waive Eighth Amend-
ment protections by choosing a cruel and unusual punishment.
Finally, this Article explains that at least in the context of punishment
type, a defendant's choice should not waive Eighth Amendment protec-
tions. The ban on cruel and unusual punishments is a right that differs sig-
nificantly from other constitutional criminal rights. First, the Eighth
Amendment protects individuals, but the Supreme Court has indicated that
the amendment also serves a societal purpose by prohibiting the use of
especially cruel punishments. The ban on cruel and unusual punishments
preserves the right of society not to have barbarous punishments used on its
behalf. Second, the waiver of this right differs from the waiver of other
13. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
14. Also, recent activities regarding the use of the electric chair highlight the importance of the
issue. Florida legislators and Governor Jeb Bush have agreed to hold a special session early in 2000 to
consider giving condemned inmates the choice between the electric chair nd lethal injection. See John
Kennedy, Death-Penalty Changes for New Year: The Electric Chair Is Expected to Get Pushe.d Astd
for Lethal Injection, and Bush Wants a Speedier Appeals Process, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 10, 1999,
at D4, available in LEXIS, News Library, Orsent File. The legislative ction was in response to thc
United States Supreme Court's decision to grant review of Florida's use of the electric chair. See Id.;
see also Bryan v. Moore, 120 S. Ct. 394 (1999) (granting petition for writ of certiorari to -address the
constitutionality of the use of the electric chair). Meanwhile, after a recent execution in Ohio, Gover-
nor Bob Taft was suprised to learn that his state still allows the electric chair as an option and asked
legislators to ban its use. See Sandy Theis, Taft Calls for an End to Electric Chair Use, PLAIN DEALER,
Nov. 24, 1999, at IA, available in LEXIS, News Library, Clevpd File.
15. See, e.g, Steven A. Blum, Public Executions: Understanding the "Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments" Clause, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 413, 451 (1992) ('One may not consent to cruel and un-
usual punishment. For example, even if given the choice ofpunishnents between torture mad death, the
prisoner could not choose torture.").
16. See LaGrand, 119 S. Ct. at 1020.
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constitutional criminal rights because such Eighth Amendment waivers do
not benefit individuals or society. Third, to allow such Eighth Amendment
waivers would permit legislatures to create any punishment options it de-
sired, such as boiling in oil, drawing and quartering, or beheading. There-
fore, the Eighth Amendment prohibits the use of a cruel and unusual pun-
ishment even if the defendant has chosen that punishment over a constitu-
tional one.
II. EIGHTH AMENDMENT BACKGROUND
A. Origins of the "Cruel and Unusual Punishments" Clause
The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted."'7 The language of the Eighth Amendment derives from the
English Bill of Rights of 1689,"8 though there were previous documents,
such as the Bible 9 and the Magna Carta, that were concerned that sen-
tences be proportional.2 By the time the "cruel and unusual punishment"
provision was adopted as part of the Eighth Amendment in 1791, the lan-
guage had been used in several other documents in the United States so
that the phrase was considered constitutional "boilerplate" language.2
17. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishments applies to the states through the Fourteenth AmendmenL See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV;
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding that a state law that makes narcotics addic-
tion a crime violates the Eighth Amendment).
18. "In fact, the entire text of the Eighth Amendment is taken almost verbatim from the English
Declaration of Rights, which provided '[t]hat excessive Baile ought not to be required nor excessivc
Fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall Punishments inflicted.'" Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,
966 (1991) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (quoting English Declaration of Rights of 1689).
19. "The first historical, sanctioned, and arguably moral version of like for like in Western culture
is the lax talionis, or law of exact retaliation. Readers will be familiar with the lex tallonis in the 'eye
for eye, tooth for tooth' language of three seprate passages of the Jewish Torah, or biblical Pentateuch."
MARVIN HENBERG, RETRIBUTION: EVIL FOR EVIL IN ETHics, LAW, AND LITERATURE 60 (1990); see
also Exodus 21"22-25; Deuteronomy 19:19-21; Leviticus 24:17-21. Interestingly, these three Biblical
provisions that provide the "eye for an eye" language actually address three specific crimes: "hurting a
pregnant woman, pejuy, and guarding Yahweh's alter against defilement." HENBERG, supra, at 69.
20. See Daniel E. Hall, When Caning Meets the Eighth Amendment: Whipping Offenders In the
United States, 4 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 403, 409-10 (1995); see also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285-
86 (1983) (discussing English history of guaranteeing proportional punishments). One commentator,
in reviewing the history of the development of the Eighth Amendment, argues that the American
framers misinterpreted English law. See Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 860-65 (1969). According to Mr. Granucci,
under English law, the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments only reflected a prohibition
on excessive punishments, but the Americans interpreted it to proscribe torturous punishments. See Id.
at 865. Cf Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 967-85 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (arguing that the Eighth
Amendment does not have a general proportionality component); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349, 385-413 (1910) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Eighth Amendment only prohibits tortur-
ous punishments and does not have a proportionality component).
21. See Granucci, supra note 20, at 840. In the United States, the clause was first used in the Dec-
laration of Rights in Virginia's Constitution upon a proposal by George Mason. See Id Before it was
[Vol. 32:615
Perhaps because the language was already accepted in the country, appar-
ently there was little discussion of the meaning of the terms "cruel and
unusual punishment" by the members of the First Congress.' As one
commentator noted:
In the glorious act of framing a social compact expressive of the
supreme law, Americans tended simply to draw up a random cata-
logue of rights that seemed to satisfy their urge for a statement of
first principles--or for some of them. That task was executed in a
disordered fashion that verged on ineptness.?
Thus, there has been considerable debate about the original meaning of the
ban on cruel and unusual punishments," and the main source of the mean-
ing of the terms "cruel and unusual" has been the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation.'
B. The Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment Analysis
The Supreme Court has developed several principles from the Eighth
Amendment.'s First, the Eighth Amendment prohibits particular punish-
ments that are inherently unacceptable and beyond civilized standards.P
Second, the amendment prohibits punishments that are excessive in rela-
tion to the crime or the criminal. Third, the amendment requires appro-
adopted in the U.S. Constitution, eight other states adopted the phrase and the federal government used
the clause in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. See a
22. See Hall, supra note 20, at 411-12 n35; Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,244 (1972) (Doug-
las, J., concurring). "The Eighth Amendment received little attention during the proposal and adoption
of the Federal Bill of Rights." Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 979 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
23. Granucci, supra note 20, at 840-41 n.8.
24. See supra notes 18-20.
25. See Hugo Adam Bedau, Thinking of the Death Penalt as a Cruel and Unusual PunlsurrnI, 18
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 873, 892-97 (1985). Professor Bedan wTote:
[We face substantial obstacles to ascertaining the original intention in this instace: (a) we
have no text or document in which the framers stated their shared intention (if they even had
one) in including the Clause in the eighth amendment; (b) the framers left no statement
telling us what they understood the language of this Clause to mean; (c) we have no list pre-
pared by the framers specifying the properties a punishment must have to be prohibited un-
der the Clause; (d) they provided no exhaustive catalogue of the punishments they regarded
as prohibited under this Clause. Since we have no explicit indication in any of these four
ways of what they understood by the Clause, any knowledge that we claim of their Intention
in using it must be based on very indirect evidence.
I at 893. Cf. generally Granucci, supra note 20.
26. See, e.g., Margaret J. Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death: Evoh'lngStandardsfor the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 989,997-1000 (1978). In addition to the three prin-
ciples listed above, Professor Radin notes that the Eighth Amendment also applies to prison conditions
and the power to criminalize. See id at 992-96.
27. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,381 (1910) (addressing hard labor).
28. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,994 (1991) (majority of Justices concluding that
the Eighth Amendment has a proportionality component for capital punishment cases); Solem v. Helm,
463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983) (setting aside, as disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment, a sentence
of life imprisonment under a South Dakota recidivist statute); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801
(1982) (holding that imposing a death sentence for felony murder defendant who did not kill or con-
2000] LET'AMKE A DEAL
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priate procedures to ensure that a punishment is imposed in a way that is
fair to the degree required by the punishment and consistent with the ob-
jectives of that punishment.29
The beginning of the Court's interpretation of the Eighth Amend-
ment starts almost ninety years after the ratification of the Eighth Amend-
ment, when the United States Supreme Court made its first substantive
ruling regarding the meaning of "cruel and unusual punishments" in Wil-
kerson v. Utah.3 In that case, the Court held that an execution by shooting
as a punishment for first degree murder was not a cruel and unusual pun-
ishment.3 Although the Court rejected the defendant's arguments, it did
indicate that certain forms of torture would be prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment, and it referred to examples of where a prisoner is drawn or
dragged to the place of execution, embowelled alive, beheaded and quar-
tered, dissected in public, or burned alive.32 The Court added that other
punishments "in the same line of unnecessary cruelty" violate the Eighth
Amendment.33
The Court expanded the discussion twelve years later in upholding a
challenge to execution by electrocution under the Fourteenth Amendment
in In re Kemmler.34 "Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a
lingering death .... It implies there is something inhuman and barba-
rous,-something more than the mere extinguishment of life." ' Although
these early Eighth Amendment cases focused on the history and cruel na-
ture of certain punishments, subsequent cases began to place more empha-
template that life would be taken violates the Eighth Amendment); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
598 (1977) (holding that imposing a death sentence for the crime of rape violates the Eighth Amend-
ment because the punishment is disproportionate to the crime).
29. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (noting that the death penalty cannot be
imposed under sentencing procedures that create a "substantial risk" that it will be imposed "in an
arbitrary and capricious manner").
30. 99 U.S. 130 (1878). The Eighth Amendment was ratified in 1791. See Jonathan A. Void, Note,
The Eighth Amendment "Punishment" Clause After Helling v. McKinney: Four Terms, Two Stan-
dards, and a Search for Definition, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 215, 220 (1994). Fourteen years before JVii-
kerson, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment did not apply to the states, but it added that there
was nothing cruel or unusual in a $50 fine and three-months imprisonment at hard labor for the illegal
sale and keeping of intoxicating liquors. See Pervearv. Commonwealth, 72 U.S. 475,479-80 (1866).
31. See Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 137.
32. See id at 135-36.
33. Id. at 136.
34. 136 U.S. 436 (1890). At the time Kemmler was decided, the Court did not apply the Eighth
Amendment to the states, so the challenge was based upon the Fourteenth Amendment. See Id. at 446.
In Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080 (1985), the Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari that raised
an Eighth Amendment challenge to the electric chair. Such a denial is not a ruling on the merits, but
Justice Brennan in dissent noted that electric chair claims are typically rejected on the basis of Kemmier
and that the case "was grounded on a number of constitutional premises that have long since been
rejected and on factual assumptions that appear not to have withstood the test of experience." Id at
1081 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Recently, the Supreme Court granted a petition of certiorari to address
the constitutionality of Florida's use of the electric chair. See Bryan v. Moore, 120 S. Ct. 394 (1999).
35. Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447.
sis on contemporary society's views regarding acceptable punishments."
In 1910, the Supreme Court finally undertook its first comprehensive
discussion of the Eighth Amendment in Weems v. United States?' In that
case, the Court's focus shifted from the original meaning of the Eighth
Amendment toward a more contemporary interpretation.33 In Weems, the
defendant was convicted of falsifying a public and official document and
given the sentence of fifteen years of cadena temporal.39 Weems chal-
lenged the sentence of cadena temporal, which included "hard and painful
labor" 0 as being cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Philip-
pines Bill of Rights.'
The Court began by noting that the Philippine Bill of Rights provision
was taken from the United States Constitution, so "it must have the same
meaning.!" 2 The Court then discussed the history of the Eighth Amend-
ment and the cases discussed above!3 The Court noted, however, "Time
works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. There-
fore a principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider application than the
mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions."
Further, the Court stated: "The clause of the Constitution, in the opinion of
the learned commentators may be therefore progressive and is not fastened
to the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes en-
lightened by a humane justice."'  Thus, the Court reasoned that it was not
bound by the original meaning of the terms and that while legislatures have
discretion to determine the appropriate punishment for crimes, it is up to
the judiciary to determine the constitutional limits of punishment.L" How-
ever, in addressing the present facts, the Court stated that the conditions at
36. See e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972);
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). See also Sander
Jacobowitz, Note, Rattling Chains and Smashing Rocks: Testing the Botmdarles of the Eighth Amznd-
ment, 28 RuTGE.s LJ. 519,524 (1997).
37. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). "No case has occurred in this court which has called for an exhaustive
definition." I at 369. See also Pressly Millen, Note, Interpretation of the Eighth Amendnrr 1t-Rum-
meL Solent, and the Venerable Case ofWeems v. United States, 1984 DUKE L REV. 789,798.
38. See Weems, 217 U.S. at378. See also Void, supra note 30, at221.
39. See Weems, 217 U.S. at357-58.
40. Ido at 364. The Court noted that those sentenced to cadena temporal
"shall labor for the benefit of the state. They shall always carry a chain at the ankle, hanging from
the wrists; they shall be employed at hard and painful labor, and shall receive no assistance what-
soever from without the institution." There are, besides, certain accessory penalties imposed,
which are defined to be (1) civil interdiction; (2) perpetual absolute disqualification; (3) subjec-
tion to surveillance during life.
Id (quoting Philippine Penal Code Arts. 105, 106).
41. See id at 363-65.
42. Id at367.
43. See id. at368-73.
44. l at373.
45. d at378.
46. See i at 379.
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the time of the adoption of the Constitution provided sufficient guidance.47
The sentence of cadena temporal is cruel and unusual because "[i]t is cruel
in its excess of imprisonment and that which accompanies and follows
imprisonment' t8 and "[i]t is unusual in its character. '9 Additionally, the
Court expressed concern that the punishment was excessive in relation to
the crime. 0
Over the next fifty years, the Court addressed the Eighth Amendment
in only a handful of cases.5 Among these, the Court in Louisiana ex rel.
Francis v. Resweber 2 held that having to repeat an electrocution to suc-
cessfully execute a defendant was not cruel and unusual punishment.53 It
was not until 1958 in Trop v. Dulles,5' however, that the Court extensively
expanded on the discussion of the Eighth Amendment in Weems.
In Trop, the petitioner, a native born American, had lost his United
States citizenship because of his conviction by court-martial for desertion
during war.5" A plurality of the Court held that denationalization as a pun-
ishment is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.56 The plurality began its
47. See id at 375.
48. Id at377.
49. Id Although the Court noted that the statute would have been struck down even If it wero a
"[federal enactment," it also seemed more willing to strike down the punishment because it was for-
eign: "It has no fellow in American legislation. Let us remember that it has come to us from a gov-
ernment of a different form and genius from ours." Id
50. See Id at 380-82. "Such penalties for such offenses amaze those who have formed their con-
ception of the relation of a state to even its offending citizens from the practice of the American com-
monwealths, and believe that it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated
and proportioned to offense." Id at 366-67.
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Holmes, Justice White argued that the Court wrongly
gave a proportionality component to the Eighth Amendment:
The word cruel, as used in the Amendment, forbids only the lawmaking power, in prescrib-
ing punishment for crime and the courts in imposing punishment from inflicting unneccs-
sary bodily suffering through a resort to inhuman methods for causing bodily torture, like or
which are of the nature of the cruel methods of bodily torture which had been made use of
prior to the Bill of Rights of 1689, and against the recurrence of which the word cruel was
used in that instrument.
Id at 409 (White, J., dissenting).
51. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (holding that revoking citizenship is a violation of cruel
and unusual punishment); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947) (holding
that a second electrocution after the first attempt failed was not cruel and unusual); United States ex rel
Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Publ'g Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 430, 435 (1921) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that a fine imposed for mall fraud, which may compound indefinitely over time,
constitutes an excessive fine in violation of the Eighth Amendment); Badders v. United States, 240
U.S. 391,393-94 (1916) (holding that crime of mailing letters in execution of scheme to defraud, which
made mailing of each letter a separate offense, did not violate Eighth Amendment).
52. 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
53. See id at 464. Also, in Resweber, four Justices stated that the Eighth Amendment applies to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See id at 462-63. A majority of the Court would support
this conclusion fifteen years later in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 664-68 (1962).
54. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
55. See id at 88.
56. See id at 101-04.
[Vol. 32:615
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Eighth Amendment analysis by noting that denationalization was not dis-
proportionate to the crime of wartime desertion,5' thus framing the issue as
whether the penalty is forbidden by "the principle of civilized treatment
guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment.!' 8
In looking at the punishment of denationalization per se, the opinion
noted that just because the death penalty may be acceptable does not mean
that any punishment short of death is permitted.59 The plurality briefly
discussed the history of the Eighth Amendment, noting, "The basic concept
underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.
While the State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure
that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards."'
Then, the plurality made a statement that has often been repeated in Eighth
Amendment cases: "The Amendment must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing soci-
ety.""6
1
The Court held that denationalization as a punishment does violate the
Eighth Amendment, and the opinion noted that "[ilt is a form of punish-
ment more primitive than torture, for it destroys for the individual the po-
litical existence that was centuries in the development." The plurality
looked at practices in other countries, concluding that a denationalized
citizen is stateless, "a condition deplored in the international community of
democracies," and he may be subject to banishment, "a fate universally
decried by civilized people." Thus, the plurality used objective societal
standards as part of its Eighth Amendment analysis.
Another point of interest in the Trop case is that the plurality, in a foot-
note, discussed a possible distinction between the terms "cruel" and "un-
usual." 5 Noting that some decisions by the Court have only examined a
punishment "in light of the basic prohibition against inhuman treatment, '
the opinion stated that if the word "unusual" is to have any meaning, it
should signify "something different from that which is generally done."
This aspect of Trop also reflected an essential connection between current
societal standards and the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.
57. See !i. at 99. The opinion noted that wartime desertion may be punish-cble by dec.ih See Id
58. Id
59. See id.
60. Id at 100.
61. Id
62. Id at 101.
63. Id at 102. The opinion noted that a United Nations survey of nationality laws of 84 countries
revealed that only two imposed denationalization as a penalty for desertion. See Id at 103.
64. Id at 102.
65. See id at 100 n.32.




After subsequent cases held that the Eighth Amendment applies to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment,6" the next major Eighth
Amendment cases involved the death penalty. In Furman v. Georgia," in
a long and fractured decision, the Court held that the death sentences be-
fore it, which were imposed under a sentencing system of complete jury
discretion, violated the Eighth Amendment." While two of the Justices
reasoned that the death penalty was unconstitutional in all cases,"' the other
three Justices who voted to strike down the statutes focused on the arbitrary
nature of the process in which the sentences were imposed.' Thus, the
Justices indicated that not only does the Eighth Amendment contain a pro-
hibition on certain punishments and have a proportional guarantee, it also
mandates certain procedural requirements, at least in the context of capital
cases.
In Furman, the Justices followed the "evolving standards" approach of
Trop, again reflecting the connection between the interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment and societal standards. Despite the nine separate
opinions, all of the Justices rejected a strict historical interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment and refused to limit the amendment's restrictions to
punishments that were prohibited in the late Eighteenth Century. 3
A few years later, the Court again addressed the issue of capital pun-
ishment under the Eighth Amendment in Gregg v. Georgia.4 In that case,
the Court upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty and the guided
discretion sentencing scheme that was at issue.75
The Gregg plurality began its analysis by quoting the "evolving stan-
68. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (holding that a law prohibiting intoxication in a
public place was not cruel and unusual); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding that law
making narcotics addiction a crime violates the Eighth Amendment).
69. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Furman is often overlooked in evaluations of the Court's Eighth
Amendment analysis because of the subsequent decision in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
Furman, however, was never overruled and it remains good law. One difficulty with the case Is the
fact that each Justice wrote a separate opinion, creating an overwhelming overall length of the decision.
See BOB WOODWARD & SCoTr ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 220
(1981) ("The nine separate opinions totaled 50,000 words, 243 pages-the longest decision in the
Court's history.").
70. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 239.40.
71. See id at 305-06 (Brennan, J., concurring); id at 358-60 (Marshall, J., concurring).
72. See id at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring); id at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); Id at 313
(White, J., concurring).
73. See id at 241-43 (Douglas, J., concurring); id at 265-66 (Brennan, J., concurring); Id at 307-08
(Stewart, J., concurring); id at 312-14 (White, J., concurring); id at 329 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("a
penalty that was permissible at one time in our Nation's history is not necessarily permissible today');
id. at 382 (Burger, CJ., dissenting, joined by Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JLo) ("the Eighth
Amendment prohibition cannot fairly be limited to those punishments thought excessively cruel and
barbarous at the time of the adoption of the Eighth Amendment").
74. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). In Gregg, Justice Stewart wrote the main opinion, which was joined by
Justices Powell and Stevens. See id
75. See id at 168-69.
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dards" language from Trop.76 The plurality stressed that "an assessment of
contemporary values concerning the infliction of a challenged sanction is
relevant to the application of the Eighth Amendment."' The plurality then
used a two-prong analysis in determining whether a punishment violates
the Eighth Amendment. First, a court must look at contemporary stan-
dards, examining "objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a
given sanction." Second, a punishment must accord with "the dignity of
man." At the least, a punishment must not be excessive, meaning (1) "the
punishment must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain,"" and (2) "the punishment must not be grossly out of proportion to
the severity of the crime.""1
Applying the first prong of the analysis to the death penalty per se, the
plurality looked to history, state legislatures' responses to Furman, popular
votes, and jury verdicts.Y The plurality noted that the enactment of new
death penalty statutes after Furman and jurors' willingness to impose the
death penalty weighed in favor of finding that contemporary society ac-
cepts the death penalty and that, therefore, it does not violate the Eighth
Amendment.'a
Concerning the subjective prong, the plurality looked to the justifica-
tions for the death penalty, such as retribution and deterrence," noting that
"the sanction imposed cannot be so totally without penological justification
that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering."e Finally, the plural-
ity looked at whether the punishment was disproportionate to the crime and
found that the death penalty is not a cruel and unusual punishment.'
Thereafter, the plurality examined whether Georgia's procedures
imposing the death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment." Thus, the
opinion reasserted that the Eighth Amendment mandates certain procedural
requirements in capital cases.
76. See idJ at 173 (quoting Trap v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
77. Id.
78. Id
79. Id (quoting Trap, 356 U.S. at 100).
80. Id
81. Id This analysis does not require a legislature to select the least severe penalty. See !d at 175.
Furthermore, the Court presumes a punishment selected by a democratically elected legislature is valid.
See id
82. See id at 176-82.
83. See id at 182.
84. See id at 183.
85. Id.
86. See id at 187.
87. See id at 196-207. Other articles give a more detailed discussion of the application of the
Eighth Amendment to procedures used to impose the death penalty. See, e.g., Jeflcy L Kirchincier,
Aggravating andMitigating Factors: The Paradox of Today's Arbitrary and Mndatory CapItal Pun-
ishment Scheme, 6 Wm. & MARY BILL OF RIGTS J. 345 (1998); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. SteIker,
Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punish-
ment, 109 HARv. L REv. 355,384 (1995).
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After that decision, the Supreme Court consistently followed Gregg's
principles, using both an objective and subjective analysis for determining
whether a punishment is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.8
Most of the subsequent Eighth Amendment cases dealt either with proce-
dures for imposing the death penalty 9 or with prison conditions," where
the Court has held that the Eighth Amendment applies to conditions of
confinement that are not imposed as part of the sentence.9
Only rarely has the Supreme Court struck down a specific punish-
ment as cruel and unusual, as it did in Weems and Trop. However, one
year after Gregg, in Coker v. Georgia, 2 the Court struck down the use of
the death penalty for a defendant convicted of raping a woman because the
punishment was disproportionate to the crime. In that case, one of the
foundations for the Court's ruling was the objective indicators that con-
temporary society-as reflected in the form of legislatures and juries-had
rejected the death penalty for rape crimes." In other capital cases, the
Court has looked at societal standards and similarly limited the application
of the death penalty on such factors as the age of the defendant,94 insanity
88. Cf. Void, supra note 30, at 229-30 (arguing that the Court varied Gregg's analysis In Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), but subsequently returned to Gregg's original formulation). But see
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,345-47 (1981) (explaining Estelle as consistent with Gregg's analy-
sis).
89. See, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 647-48, 653-55 (1990) (discussing the role of the
judge, instead of the jury, to determine mitigating and aggravating factors, and the adequacy of the
Arizona Supreme Court's guidance concerning aggravating factors); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420,
428 (1980) (requiring that capital jurors be given "clear and objective standards") (quoting Gregg, 428
U.S. at 198)); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978) (holding that a death penalty statute may not
limit the mitigating factors ajuiy may consider).
90. See, e.g., Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (holding that civil rights petitioner
stated an Eighth Amendment cause of action due to exposure to environmental tobacco smoke In
prison); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,302 (1991) (holding that "Eighth Amendment claims based on
official conduct that does not purport to be the penalty formally imposed for a crime require Inquiry
into state of mind"); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978) (affirming conclusion that prison Isola-
tion conditions violated Eight Amendment).
Many of the prison cases address evolving standards of decency in the context of prison condi-
tions and prisoners' medical needs. The "deliberate indifference" standard applied In these cases,
however, is not applicable to punishment methods discussed in this Article. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at
346-47 (noting that deliberate indifference analysis relies upon a different determination from that of
proportionality analysis); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102-04 (holding that deliberate indifference to medical
needs of a prisoner is cruel and unusual punishment).
91. SeeHelling, 509 U.S. at29-30.
92. 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977). See generally Pamela J. Lormand, Note, Proportionate Sentencing
for Rape of a Minor: The Death Penalty Dilemma, 73 TiL. L. REV. 981 (1999) (arguing that courts
would likely enjoin any state death sentences for the rape of minor children).
93. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 593-97. The plurality noted that few states had capital punishment
statutes for rape crimes and few juries imposed that punishment on rape defendants. See Id
94. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (holding that it violates the Eighth
Amendment to execute defendants under 16 years old).
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of the defendant,95 and the role the defendant played in the homicide.'
Also, in 1983, the Court, in Solem v. Helm," addresses an Eighth
Amendment challenge to a life sentence." Helm, who had six prior felony
convictions, had been convicted of passing a bad check and was given a
sentence of life without the possibility of parole under a South Dakota re-
cidivist statute. 9 The Court held that the sentence violated the Eighth
Amendment because it was "significantly disproportionate to [the]
crime.""lce The Court explained that its proportionality analysis under the
Eighth Amendment is guided by objective criteria, including a comparison
with contemporary sentences imposed in that jurisdiction and other juris-
dictions.'' Although Harmelin v. Michigan"°2 later questioned the validity
of the test used in Solem,0 3 a majority of the Justices in Harmelin reaf-
firmed that the Eighth Amendment has a proportionality requirement.'0 '
Perhaps because of the limited number of punishments used in the
United States during its relatively short history, the Court has not had to
address the constitutionality of many punishments. Today, however, sev-
eral states are experimenting with alternative sentences, such as castration
for sex offenders. In addition to the use of the castration option in individ-
ual sentencings, state legislatures recently have passed statutes that provide
for "chemical castration" as a punishment"es and one state, Texas, has
95. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,409-10 (1986) (holding that it violates the constitution
to execute an insane defendant).
96. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) (holding that to execute a felony murder defen-
dant who did not actually kill the victim, the defendant must have had major participation in the felony
and shown reckless indifference to human life); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 788 (1982) (holding
that it violates the Constitution to execute felony murderer who did not kill or attempt to kill).
97. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
98. See id. at283.
99. See id. at 279-82.
100. Id at 303. Cf Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284,85 (1980) (rejecting an Eighth Amend-
ment challenge and holding that determining the appropriate length of a sentence is the role of the st
legislature in upholding a life sentence pursuant to a Texas recidivist statute).
101. The Courtnoted:
In sum, a court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment should be guided by
objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty;
(it) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (Hii) the sentences
imposed for commission of the same crime in otherjurisdictions.
Solm, 463 U.S. at 292.
102. 501 U.S. 957(1991).
103. See id.at965.
104. See k at 996 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, joined by O'Connor and Souter, JJ.) (arguing
that stare decisis directs adherence to a proportionality requirement); Id at 1012 OVhite, 1., dissenting,
joined by Blackmun and Stevens, JJ.) (arguing that the Eighth Amendment includes "a proportionality
principle"); id at 1027 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (same). Only Justices Scalia and Chief Justice
Rehnquist argued that the Eighth Amendment--at least for non-capital cases-does not have a propor-
tionality requirement See id at 965, 990-94.
105. At least six states-California, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, and Montana-have lavs
permitting chemical castration. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 645(b) & (d) (West 1999) (requiring twice
convicted sex abusers of children 13 or younger, as a condition of parole, to receive regular shots of a
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passed a statute allowing surgical castration."as The Court has not had the
opportunity to address whether castration is a cruel and unusual punish-
ment, though at least one state supreme court has held that surgical castra-
tion is a cruel and unusual punishment."°
To date, the Court has never struck down a method of execution as
"cruel and unusual," although individual Justices have argued in dissent
that certain methods are unconstitutional.0 8 The Supreme Court and lower
federal courts have noted in dicta that beheading is one of the traditional
methods of execution prohibited by the Eighth Amendment."e As noted
above, the Court has also mentioned that other punishments, such as public
dissection and burning alive, would violate the Eighth Amendment. 110
Further, lower federal courts have held that execution by hanging.' and by
testosterone-lowering hormone); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.0235 (West Supp. 1999) (providing for ad-
ministration of medroxyprogesterone acetate to persons convicted of sexual battery); GA. CODE ANN, §
42-9-44.2(a) (Harrison 1999) (providing for chemical treatment and counseling as a parole condition
for child molesters); IOWA CODE ANN. § 903B.1 (West Supp. 1999) (providing for "[h]ormonal inter-
vention therapy" for some sex offenders); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 538.C(2)(b)(i) (West Supp. 1999)
(providing for chemical treatment as part of sex offenders' parole eligibility); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-
5-512 (1999) (providing for chemical treatment ofsome sex offenders); John Griener, Senate Approves
Castration ofSex Offenders, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Mar. 11, 1999, at 8, available In LEXIS, News
Library, Dlyokn File. At least twenty other states have considered chemical castration laws. See Jenni-
fer M. Bund, Comment, Did You Say Chemical Castration?, 59 U. PIrr. L. REV. 157, 172 (1997).
106. See TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 501.061 (West 1998) (providing "orchiectomy" option for cer-
tain sex offenders). An orchiectomy is the "[r]emoval of one or both testes." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 1257 (26th ed. 1995). The Texas legislature recently became the first state to allow repeat
sex offenders to undergo voluntary surgical castration. See Bruce Tomaso, Some Inmates Volunteering
for Castration, So Far 4 Texas Molesters Want Surgical Procedure, DALLAS MORNING NEWs, Apr. 22,
1999, at 33A, available in LEXIS, News Library, Danws File.
107. See State v. Brown, 326 S.E.2d 410, 412 (S.C. 1985) (holding that castration Is a cruel and
unusual punishment). Recently, the Oklahoma legislature considered a bill that would allow castration
for convicted sex offenders, but "[e]ven its most ardent supporters in the House believe It Is unconsti-
tutional because it would impose cruel and unusual punishment." Tim Talley, Politically Charged
Legislation, THE JOURNAL RECORD (Oklahoma City, Okla.), Mar. 16, 1999, available In 1999 WL
9844009.
Of the two types of castration in sex offender statutes, surgical castration is more likely uncon-
stitutional than the use of chemical castration, which is not permanent and is seen more as a type of
treatment by some. See Beckman, supra note 2, at 880-93 (arguing that chemical castration Is not a
cruel and unusual punishment for male sex offenders). Cf Robert D. Miller, FarcedAdministration of
Sex-Drive Reducing Medications to Sex Offenders: Treatment or Punishment?, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB,
POL'Y & L. 175, 183-88, 195-99 (1998) (questioning legality and ethics ofconstitutionality of chemical
treatment of criminal defendants).
108. See Gomez v. United States Dist. Court, 503 U.S. 653, 658 (1992) (per curiam) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting, joined by Blackmun, J.) (arguing that the gas chamber violates the Eighth Amendment);
Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1094 (1985) (Brennan, J. dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.) (argu-
ing that the electric chair violates the Eighth Amendment).
109. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,264 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring); Wllkerson v. Utah,
99 U.S. 130, 135 (1878); Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 681 (9th Cir. 1994); Rupe v. Wood, 863 F.
Supp. 1307, 1314 (,V.D. Wash. 1994), affirmed in part, vacated Inpart, 93 F.3d 1434 (9th Cir. 1996).
110. See Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135.
111. See Rupe, 863 F. Supp. at 1315 (holding that hanging a defendant who weighs over 400 pounds
presented a significant risk of decapitation and therefore the method was unconstitutional), case held
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gas12 are cruel and unusual punishments, though neither holding yet has
been upheld by the Supreme Court. Recently, especially gruesome execu-
tions in Florida's electric chair have raised questions about that method of
execution,1 and the Supreme Court has granted a petition for a writ of
certiorari to evaluate the electric chair." 4
In the analysis of specific execution methods, the lower courts have
generally followed the Supreme Court in examining both objective and
subjective factors.' Although one Ninth Circuit decision placed more
emphasis on subjective factors," 6 the Supreme Court has continued to look
moot by Rupe, 93 F.3d at 1438-39 (noting that under new Washington law, a capital defendant will be
executed by lethal injection unless he or she chooses to be hanged). See also Campbell v. Wood, 511
U.S. 1119, 1121-22 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of stay of execution and denial of
petition for writ of certiorari) (arguing that execution by hanging violates the constitution).
112. See LaGrand v. Stewart, 173 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir.) (holding that Arizona's use of the gas
chamber violates the Eighth Amendment), rev'd and Injunction vacated, Stewart v. LaGrand, 119 S. Ct.
1018, 1021 (1999); Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301, 309 (9th Cir.) (holding California's use of gas
chamber violates the Eighth Amendment), vacated and remanded, 519 US. 918 (1996) (remanding
case in light of change in California's death penalty statute making lethal injection the default method
of execution).
113. See Deborah W. Denno, Is Electrocution an Unconstitutional Method of Execution? Th, Engi-
neeing of Death Over the Century, 35 W1M. & MARY L. RE v. 551, 690 (1994) (arguing that execution
in the electric chair is a cruel and unusual punishment); Jo Becker, Court May Be Ready to Rethink
Chair, ST. PETERSBURG TImS, July 10, 1999, at IA, available in LEXIS, News Library, Stpcte File
("Amid signs that the state Supreme Court is willing to reconsider Florida's method of executing kill-
ers, Gov. Jeb Bush... reiterated his support for the electric chair"); Mike Schneider, Electric Chair
Faces New Court Challenge: Lawyer Says It's Cruel, Unusual, SUN-SEIMNEL, July 28, 1999, at 6B,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Sunsen File (reporting that: "Flames erupted during the executions
of [Jesse] Tafero and [Pedro] Medina in 1990 and 1997; and during [Allen] Davis' execution [in July
1999], blood gushed from the mask covering his face, poured over his collar and chest, then oozed
through the buckle holes on the chest strap holding him in the oaken chair.").
114. See Bryan v. Moore, 120 S. Ct. 394 (1999) (granting petition for writ of certiorari to address the
constitutionality of Florida's use of the electric chair).
115. See Ferro, 77 F.3d at 309 (holding that execution by lethal gas under California protocol is
cruel and unusual punishment), vacated and remanded, 519 U.S. 918 (1996) (remanding case in light
of change in California's death penalty statute making lethal injection the default method ofexecution).
116. See Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 682-83 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that execution by hanging
is not a cruel and unusual punishment and noting that fact that few states use hanging is not disposi-
tive). In Campbell, the court stressed that review of methods of execution should rely more on evi-
dence of pain involved in the challenged method than on the number of states that use that method of
execution. See Id at 682. The court held, "[w]e cannot conclude that judicial hanging Is incompatible
with evolving standards of decency simply because few states continue the practice." Id
In a strong dissent, the dissenting judges criticized the majority for not following Supreme
Court precedent on the proper analysis. See Id at 692-711 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). Judge Reinhardt
wrote:
If only a single, narrow "unnecessary infliction of pain" test applies to Eighth Amendment
challenges to methods of punishment, the majority must be truly sagacious in discovering
this rule, for it is the first court in more than two centuries of the Bill of Rights ever to have
suggested it In fact, the premise upon which the majority's holding is founded is so novel
and extraordinary it was not even suggested by the state.
Id at 706. Others have criticized the majority decision on that ground that it "constituted an unsophis-
ticated and disappointing exercise in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence." Deborah Dnno, Getting to
Death: Are Executions Constitutional?, 82 IOWA L. REV. 319, 340 (1997) [hereinafter Denno, Getting
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to objective standards-such as jurors and legislatures-in its Eighth
Amendment analysis." 7
Thus, in addition to requiring certain procedures, the Eighth Amend-
ment prohibits certain punishments per se and prohibits punishments that
are disproportionate to the crime. Although the Supreme Court has not
found many punishments to be "cruel and unusual," there are some pun-
ishments that it has found unconstitutional and others, such as torture and
beheading, that the Court has indicated would violate the constitution.
HI. WAIVER OF EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS
A. General Eighth Amendment Waiver
Although certain punishments and procedures violate the Eighth
Amendment, there is an issue of whether a defendant may waive Eighth
Amendment protections. The Court has long permitted criminal defen-
dants to waive constitutional rights such as the Fourth Amendment right to
be free from searches and seizures absent probable cause,' the Fifth
Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination," 9 the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial,' the Sixth Amendment right to confron-
tation,' and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.'"
The Supreme Court has established requirements for a waiver of rights
such as the right to counsel and the prohibition against compulsory self-
incrimination."n The defendant's waiver, as reflected in the trial record,
to Death]. See also Campbell, 511 U.S. at 1121-22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of petition
for writ of certiorari) (describing lower court's conclusion as "surprising" considering the Court's
Eighth Amendment precedents).
117. See, e.g., Pemy v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989) (rejecting argument that there is a na-
tional consensus against executing the mentally retarded and holding that it does not violate the consti-
tution to permit such executions); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (plurality opinion
allowing execution of 16 and 17 year olds); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (plu-
rality opinion holding that it violates the Eighth Amendment to execute 15 year olds).
118. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973) (holding that the police do not need
probable cause to search if the defendant consented to the search).
119. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,243 (1969) (noting that a defendant waives the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination when the defendant pleads guilty).
120. See id (noting that a defendant waives the right to a jury trial when the defendant pleads
guilty).
121. See id (noting that a defendant waives the right to confront one's accusers when the defendant
pleads guilty).
122. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463-64
(1938).
123. See Brian R. Boch, Note, Fourteenth Amendment-The Standard of Mental Competency to
Waive Constitutional Rights Versus the Competency Standard to Stand Trial, 84 J. CIuM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 883, 890 (1994).
must be voluntary and "intelligent and knowinj."''
In the Constitutional context, a waiver may occur in various situations
that do not require a voluntary, intelligent and knowing waiver."s For ex-
ample, a defendant who fails to raise an Eighth Amendment issue at the
appropriate time will waive that claim," and failure to follow certain state
procedural rules will result in the waiver of all claims." Even the timing
of other Court decisions may allow a defendant to be executed despite a
constitutional violation in the case." For these types of waivers of Eighth
124. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399-401 (1993); Faretza, 422 U.S. at 835; Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); Camley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962); Johnon, 304 U.S. at
463-64 (1938).
125. "If a defense =ttomey fails to cross-examine a witness, neglects to raise and preserve a point, or
allows the time for appeal to pass, he may be waiving constitutional rights of his client." Michael E.
Tigar, Forewora" Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet In the Citadel, 84 HARV. L REV. 1, 16
(1970). Of course, in this context, the waiver often occurs because of something the defend.nt's attor-
ney did or fhiled to do and the defendant may not even be aware that a waiver is occurring. See a at
16-19; see, ag., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,752-54 (1991) (holding that federal courts would
not review capital defendant's claims where defense attorney filed notice of appeal in state habeas
proceedings three days late). Recently, a book was published about Roger Coleman's attempts to get
the courts to consider his evidence of innocence despite the error made by his attorneys. See gernraly
JoHN C. TuciKE, MAY GOD HAVE MERcY (1997) (discussing Roger Coleman's case).
126. See McCleskeyv. Zant, 499 U.S. 467,502-03 (1991) (adopting strict waver rule for defendants
who fail to raise an issue in their first habeas corpus petition); see also Antiterrorism & Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (Supp. II
1997)) (same). Although McCleskey and some of the other cas cited in support of the above para-
graph did not specifically involve Eighth Amendment claims, the Court made no distinction regarding
the constitutional basis for the underlying claim. Also, subsequent cases have applied these cases to
Eighth Amendment claims. See, e.g., Gomez v. United States Dist. Court, 503 U.S. 653 (1992) (per
curiam) (holding that the abuse of the writ doctrine regarding claims not raised in a first habeas petition
bars consideration of capital defendant's Eighth Amendment claim that execution by gas is cruel and
unusual punishment); cf Herrem v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993) (assuming that executing a
defendant who made a post-trial "truly persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence'" would violate
the Eighth Amendment despite any procedural waiver).
In Herrera, the plurality implied that the abuse of writ doctrine would not apply to Herrera's
second habeas petition's Eighth Amendment innocence claim were he able to make a "truly persuaive
demonstration of 'actual innocence.'" Id Further, at least five Justices indicated that they would
require some federal substantive review of a capital defendant's claim of actual innocence, apparently
even in spite of any procedural default or abuse of the writ. See Id at 444 (Blacknun, J, dissenting,
joined in part by Stevens and Souter, JJ.) (arguing that if a prisoner can show "he is probably actually
innocent," the execution would violate the Constitution); la at 419 (O'Connor, J., concurring,joined by
Kennedy, J.) ("I cannot disagree with the fundamental legal principle that executing the innocent is
inconsistent with the Constitution.").
127. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752 (holding that an attorney error in failing to file a state habeas
appeal on time was not "cause" to excuse petitioner's procedural default); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72, 90-91 (1977) (holding that federal'courts will not consider claim unless certain requirements
are met where defendant's counsel failed to object to constitutional violation at trial); see also Herrera,
506 U.S. at 427 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that there is no constitutional right to judicial consid-
eration of newly discovered evidence of innocence brought forth after conviction).
128. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 315-16 (1989) (holding that "new rule" will not apply to
benefit a defendant if the defendant was in post-conviction proceedings when the Court announced the
new rule). For example, in O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 157-58 (1997), the Court held that
habeas petitioner O'Dell would not benefit from a decision that was a "new rule," and O'Dell was
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Amendment or other constitutional rights, the Court does not require that
the waiver be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, though in the procedural
default area, the Court used to apply a somewhat similar standard.' 9
In the Eighth Amendment context, the voluntary, knowing and intelli-
gent waiver standard does apply to capital defendants who desire to be
executed and waive the right to appeal and the right to present mitigating
evidence at trial. 30 The issue of waiving Eighth Amendment rights by
foregoing a direct appeal in a capital punishment case was addressed in a
cursory order by the Court in the case that involved the first post-Furman
execution.13 In Gilmore v. Utah,'32 the Court held that Gary Gilmore made
a knowing and intelligent waiver of all of his federal rights when he de-
cided to forego any appeals after his conviction and sentencing.' Al-
though Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion noted that the situation
of a defendant waiving his claims and asking to be executed "may be
unique in the annals of the Court,"'34 since Gilmore, there have been sev-
eral volunteers for execution who waived their rights.'35 Several lower
courts have addressed the issue of whether a capital defendant may waive
the right to present mitigating evidence at trial,'36 and some states have
executed despite the admitted constitutional violation in his case. See Associated Press, Man Executed
Despite Protest From the Pope, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1997, at A18.
129. In Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963), the Court created a "deliberate bypass" rule that
allowed federal habeas petitioners to seek relief even if they procedurally defaulted state court remedies
if the petitioner had not deliberately bypassed the state procedures. The Court abandoned the "dcliber-
ate bypass" rule in Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 87, which required a federal habeas petitioner to show
"cause and prejudice" or "actual innocence" before a federal court would review claims that were
procedurally defaulted in the state courts.
130. See Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1013 (1976) (holding that the capital defendant waived his
right to appeal); Silagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986, 1008 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that capital defendant
waived his right to present mitigating evidence); State v. Smith, 993 S.V.2d 6, 8 (Tenn. 1999) (holding
that a capital defendant's instructions to counsel to limit or forego presentation of mitigating evidence
may not be overridden by the trial court if the defendant is competent and knowingly and voluntarily
waived his right to present such evidence).
131. For an excellent account of Gary Gilmore's life, see MIKAL GILMORE, SHOT IN THE HEART
(1994).
132. 429 U.S. 1012 (1976).
133. See id, at 1013.
134. Id, at 1013 n.1 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
135. Of the 477 people executed between the Gregg decision in 1976 and September 1998, more
than 12%, or 60 persons, were volunteers. See Ann W. O'Neill, When Prisoners Have a Death Wish; A
Rising Number of Inmates are Volunteering to Be Executed; For Some in Grips of Depression, It Is a
Desperate Bid to Gain Control over Their Lives, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 11, 1998, at Al, available In
LEXIS, News Library, Lat. File. In some states-such as Oklahoma (36%), South Carolina (27%), and
Arizona (25%)-the percentage of volunteer executions is much higher. See Amy Greene & Anthony
Thornton, State Executes Molester's Killer, THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Aug. 5, 1998, at 1, available In
LEXIS, News Library, Dlyokn File. See generally Jane L. McClellan, Note, Stopping the Rush to the
Death House: Third-Pary Standing in Death-Row Volunteer Cases, 26 ARIz. ST. LJ. 201, 202-14
(1994).
136. See, e.g., State v. Felde, 422 So. 2d 370,393 (La. 1982) (holding that there is no Eighth or Sixth
Amendment violation when a defendant chooses not to present mitigating evidence); Bishop v. State,
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statutes that prohibit the waiver of the right to appeal in capital cases.'37
Although the Court allowed the waiver of certain Eighth Amendment
rights in the execution volunteer context in Gilmore, four Justices dis-
sented, with three of them specifically addressing the waiver issue.13 1 Jus-
tice White, in an opinion joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, wrote
"that the consent of a convicted defendant in a criminal case does not
privilege a State to impose a punishment otherwise forbidden by the Eighth
Amendment."' 39 Justice Marshall wrote a separate opinion arguing that a
defendant could not agree to be executed under an unconstitutional statute
because the Eighth Amendment "also expresses a fundamental interest of
society in ensuring that state authority is not used to administer barbaric
punishments."'"
Similarly, in Lenhard v. Wolff,' Justice Marshall again wrote a dissent
that questioned the constitutionality of such waivers, and that reiterated
that the Eighth Amendment not only protects the rights of individuals, but
also embodies a fundamental interest of society against state administration
of barbaric punishments.'42 Therefore, "[s]ociety's independent stake in
enforcement of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and un-
usual punishment cannot be overridden by a defendant's purported
waiver." 143
Also, in Whitmore v. Arkansas,'" Justice Marshall, in a dissent joined
597 P.2d 273,276-77 (Nev. 1979) (holding that there is no Eighth Amendment violation when a defen-
dant chooses not to present mitigating evidence); State v. Hightower, 518 A.2d 482, 483-84 (NJ.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (holding that mitigating evidence could be presented over a defendant's
objection). See generally Linda E. Carter, Maintaining Sstemlc Integrity In Capital Cases: The Use
of Court-Appointed Counsel to Present Mitigating Evidence when the Defendant dd*ocates Death, 55
TENN. L. REV. 95 (1987).
137. See, e.g., ARIz. R. CRIM. P. 31.2(b); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1239(b) (est Supp. 1999). Justice
Marshall noted in Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 174 n.l (1990) (Marshall, J, dissenting), that
"[tlwenty-two States' statutes or rules employ language indicating that their appellate courts must
review at least the sentence in every capital case." Interestingly, after Gary Gilmore's execution, Utah
"amended its law to provide for mandatory, nonwavable appellate review." Id at 175 (citing UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-35-26(10) (Supp. 1989) (repealed 1990)); see UTAH P. CRML. P. 26(10) (providing for
automatic review of capital cases by the Utah Supreme Court).
138. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun, the one judge not directly addressing the 'waiver Issue on the
merits, stated that because of the importance of the issue facing the Court, it should have a hearing and
give the issue "plenary, not summary, consideration." Gilmore, 429 U.S. at 1020 (Blackmun, J, dis-
senting).
139. H, at 1018 (,Vhite, J., dissenting).
140. Id at 1019 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
141. 444 U.S. 807 (1979).
142. See id. at 811 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
143. Id See also Carter, supra note 136, at 127-28 CPermitting a defendant to waive or forego the
presentation of mitigating evidence defeats the public's interest inherent in the [E]ighth
[A]mendment.").
144. 495 U.S. 149, 156 (1990) (holding that a death row inmate did not have standing to challenge
the validity of the death sentence of another death row inmate who elected to forego his right to ppcal
to the state supreme court).
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by Justice Brennan, argued that a capital defendant should not be able to
waive his right to appeal to the state supreme court.4 ' He stated that "A
defendant's voluntary submission to a barbaric punishment does not ame-
liorate the harm that imposing such a punishment causes to our basic so-
cietal values and to the integrity of our system of justice.""' He added,
"Certainly a defendant's consent to being drawn and quartered or burned at
the stake would not license the State to exact such punishments."'47
B. Waiver of the Eighth Amendment in the Choice of Punishment Context
Despite such pronouncements by Justices Marshall and White, the
question remained of whether a defendant may be subjected to an other-
wise cruel and unusual punishment when the defendant chooses that pun-
ishment. The Supreme Court recently indicated that the answer might be
"yes" if the defendant made a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver.
Courts have been divided on this issue in the few instances where it has
arisen. The few "choice" cases involve three different types of punishment
choices: (1) choice of banishment; (2) choice of castration; and (3) choice
of an unconstitutional method of execution.
1. Banishment Cases
As noted above, the Court in Trop held that the imposition of banish-
ment as a punishment violates the Eighth Amendment.141 Lower courts,
however, have discussed whether the use of banishment as a punishment
option is unconstitutional. In Dear Wing Jung v. United States,149 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the consti-
tutionality of a district court's suspension of a sentence of imprisonment on
the condition that the defendant leave the United States.'"0 The Ninth Cir-
cuit stated that the condition was "either a 'cruel and unusual' punishment
or a denial of due process of law. Be it one or the other, the condition is
unconstitutional."'' Importantly, in vacating the sentence, the court noted
that the fact that the defendant was, at least theoretically, free to remain in
the country and serve his sentence did not validate the imposition of an
unconstitutional condition upon the sentence.'
Another conditional banishment case, Rutherford v. Blankenship,'53
reached a similar result. In that case, a defendant "voluntarily and know-
145. See id at 171-76 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "IT]he Constitution requires mandatory, nonwal-
vable appellate review...." Id at 176.
146. Id at 173.
147. Id
148. See supra notes 54-67 and accompanying text.
149. 312 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1962).
150. Seeid at 75.
151. Id at 76.
152. See id at 75-76.
153. 468 F. Supp. 1357 (W.D. Va. 1979).
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ingly" agreed to leave Virginia as part of a plea bargain."u The district
court held that the condition of banishment, even if accepted voluntarily
and knowingly, was "null, void, and unenforceable"'55 as being against
public policy or unconstitutional. 56
One federal district court, however, permitted banishment as a condi-
tion of parole given by executive clemency. In Carchedi v. Rhodes,'" the
defendant was granted early parole by executive clemency upon the condi-
tion that he not return to Ohio without special permission for a period of
forty years."'8 When the defendant later filed a complaint seeking to nul-
lify the banishment condition, the district court noted that the governor had
broad powers'59 and that a parolee "may not be entitled to the full range of
rights accorded other citizens.""1  However, the court assumed that the
defendant's constitutional claims had some merit, but that he waived his
right to challenge the constitutionality of the banishment condition.'6' "[A]
prospective parolee may, under certain narrow circumstances, waive the
right to object to an arguably unconstitutional condition of his or her com-
mutation and parole."'" Here, the court held that the defendant voluntary
and knowingly waived his challenge to the banishment condition." To
some extent, Carchedi is distinguishable from the other conditional ban-
ishment cases because it involved a parole condition given by the broad
powers of the governor and not a sentencing condition offered by a
court.' " Still, the case is arguably inconsistent with Dear Wing Jung and
Rutherford.
2. Castration Cases
In addition to the banishment context, at least one state court has held
154. Idat 1360.
155. Idat 1361.
156. See id at 1360. See also Henry v. State, 280 S.E2d 536 (S.C. 1981) (holding that it was
against public policy for a trial judge to impose banishment from the stale as a condition ofprbafion- -
even if the defendant agreed to the sentence).
157. 560 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
158. See ad at 1011-12.
159. See id at 1014.
160. Id at 1015. The court added that "the government may impose upon the parolee certain condi-
dons of liberty which would be unconstitutional if applied to ordinary individuals.! Id
161. See id. at 1016.
162. Id The Carchedi court wrote further
The govemment, in effect, is offering to allow the prisoner to regain his or her freedom in
return for a promise to abide by rules which, to a greater or lesser extent, limit the exercise
of fundamental rights .... In these situations, if the individual i-ho received the benefit
later challenges the terms of the bargain, and if all other prerequisites of %aiver have been
met, he or she is deemed to have waived the right given up.
Id
163. See id at 1017-18.
164. See, e.g., United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1975) (noting that




that castration as a condition to suspension of a sentence violates the con-
stitution. In three cases in State v. Brown,' 65 the Supreme Court of South
Carolina held that because castration as a punishment is cruel and
unusual,' 66 castration as a condition to suspension of a sentence for
criminal sexual conduct was void. 67 There are newspaper reports of other
castration option cases,' 6' and Texas recently became the first state to pass
a statute permitting orchiectomy, or surgical castration, as a punishment
option. 69  Several other state statutes allow "chemical castration" as a
punishment option. 7 However, apparently no castration option cases be-
sides Brown have made it to the appellate courts. 7'
3. Execution Method Cases
Finally, the third type of potentially unconstitutional punishment
choice is where the state permits capital defendants to choose their method
of execution and one of the options is an unconstitutional method of exe-
cution. These choice situations have developed from states adopting new
execution methods. When a state adopts a new method, instead of resen-
tencing defendants who were sentenced to the old method, it gives those
165. 326 S.E.2d410 (S.C. 1985).
166. See id. at 412. Although the court cited to the state constitution's prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment, it cited two federal cases for the proposition that mutilation is a cruel and unusual
punishment. See id. (citing Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413 (D. Iowa 1914); Miclde v. Henrichs, 262 F. 687
(D. Nev. 1918)).
167. See id. at 411-12. Judges "are allowed a wide, but not unlimited, discretion in imposing condi-
tions of suspension or probation and they cannot impose conditions which are illegal and void as
against public policy." Id at 411.
168. See Molester Offered Choice, supra note 1, at 6; see also John M.R. Bull, Texas Trucker Pleads
No Contest to Molesting Lawrenceville Boy, PITTSBURGH PosT-GAzErm, June 8, 1999, at B-1, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, Pstgaz File (defense attorney suggested that molesting defendant might
be willing to be chemically castrated in return for a reduced sentence, and district attorney noted that
castration "was the first thing that ran through my mind"); Greiner, supra note 105, at 8 (Oklahoma
senators passed legislation to give judges the option of sentencing sex offenders to chemical neutering
or surgical castration); Molester Castrated, supra note 2, at 16A (noting that a convicted child molester
underwent voluntary castration, hoping the Illinois judge would use that fact to give the defendant a
lighter sentence).
169. See Tomaso, supra note 106, at 33A, (noting that Texas recently passed a statute that allows
repeat sex offenders to undergo voluntary surgical castration); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 501.061
(West 1999).
170. See supra note 105.
171. In Briley v. California, 564 F.2d 849, 852-53 (9th Cir. 1977), the plaintiff brought a Civil
Rights Act suit to recover for violation of his rights in a plea bargain where he was allowed to plead
guilty to a lesser offense than child molestation because he consented to castration. The court, how-
ever, did not address whether castration as a punishment violated the Eighth Amendment. See Id
One may argue that chemical castration, as opposed to surgical castration, is a "treatment" and
not a "punishment," and therefore is not subject to Eighth Amendment analysis. Viewing the nature of
the procedure in light of current Eighth Amendment cases, however, indicates that the procedure would
be subject to Eighth Amendment analysis. See Bund, supra note 105, at 180-89 (concluding that Call
fornia's chemical castration law, as written, is unconstitutional because it is unnecessary for some sex
offenders and it is inflicted arbitrarily).
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defendants a choice, while sentencing all new capital defendants to be exe-
cuted by the new method." Thus, generally only inmates sentenced prior
to the enactment of the new statute are given a choice." s
The statutes that give defendants a choice of execution methods are of
two types depending on the default method of execution. Under one type
of choice statute, if the defendant does not choose a method, the defendant
is executed by the old method in effect at the time of sentencing. 4 Under
the other type, if a defendant does not choose a method, the defendant is
executed by the new method. 7
The cases involving execution choice have come out of the Ninth Cir-
cuit, which includes California and Arizona, states that each employ the
gas chamber as an option, and Washington, which has hanging as an op-
tion. Some lower courts have found these current methods of execution
unconstitutional. In 1996, in Fierro v. Gomez,"76 the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that California's use of lethal gas to execute prison-
ers was a cruel and unusual punishment.1" In 1994, in Rupe v. Wood,"
the District Court for the Western District of Washington held that hanging
a man who weighed over 400 pounds would likely result in decapitation
and would constitute cruel and unusual punishment.'" Thus, the issue
eventually arose regarding how choice statutes would affect whether one
could be executed by hanging or in the gas chamber."'0
In Campbell v. Wood,"8' an en bane United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit addressed the constitutionality of hanging under Wash-
172. See Denno, Getting to Death, supra note 116, at 394-96.
173. In South Carolina, however, capital defendants sentenced after that state's choice statute was
enacted also get to choose their method of execution. See id at 396; S.C. CODE AN . §24-3-530(A-B)
(Law. Co-op. 1998).
174. See Denno, Getting to Death, supra note 116, at 394-96.
175. See id
176. 77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Flerro I1], vacated and remanded, Gomez v. Fierro,
519 U.S. 918 (1996) (remanding case in light of change in California's death penalty statute maldng
lethal injection the default method of execution), on remand, Fierro v. Terhune, 147 F.3d 1158 (1998)
[hereinafter "Fierro I.
177. See k at 309.
178. 863 F. Supp. 1307 (W.D. Wash. 1994), isue dismissed as moot, 93 F.3d 1434 (9th Cir. 1996).
179. See id at 1315.
180. Fierro H involved a choice statute of the type where the gas chamber was the default method of
execution. See Fierrof1,77 F.d at303. Subsequently, the California legislature amended the death
penalty statute to make lethal injection the default method of execution. See Flerro M1, 147 F.3d at
1159-60. In Fierro HI, the court held that because neither of the Section 1983 plaintiffs had chosen
lethal gas yet, the issue of the constitutionality of that method was not yet ripe. See at 1160; see also
Poland v. Stewart, 117 F.3d 1094, 1104 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that under a similar Arizona statute,
the defendant's Eighth Amendment claim was not ripe because he had not yet chosen lethal gas as the
method of execution); Rupe v. Wood, 93 F3d 1434, 1438-39 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissing as moot a
challenge to hanging as a method of execution where Washington State amended its death penalty




ington's statute, where the defendant could choose lethal injection." 2 In
holding that the constitutionality of hanging was justiciable despite the fact
that the defendant chose that method,'83 the court cited Dear Wing Jung,
which "rejected the argument that the government may cloak unconstitu-
tional punishments in the mantle of 'choice."""' The court, however, went
on to hold that execution by hanging, as done in Washington, does not
violate the Eighth Amendment."8
In one Ninth Circuit case, Poland v. Stewart,"6 the Court of Appeals
rewrote and issued its opinion on the waiver issue three times. In the first
opinion and its amended opinion, the court held that because the defendant
would have to affirmatively choose lethal gas under the Arizona statute to
be executed by that method, his choice would waive the protections of the
Eighth Amendment. 8 ' About six months later, however, the court wrote a
superseding opinion that did not resolve the choice issue, instead conclud-
ing that because the defendant had not selected lethal gas and in Arizona
lethal injection was the default method, the claim regarding lethal gas was
not ripe for review.""
In conflict with the reasoning of the initial Poland opinions, another
182. See d. at680-81.
183. The Ninth Circuit panel that initially addressed the issue held in a per curiam opinion that the
execution method issue was nonjusticiable because the state of Washington gave defendants a choice
between hanging and lethal injection. See Campbell, 978 F.2d at 1518. Interestingly, one of the judges
on the panel who voted with the rest of the judges to hold that the issue was nonjusticlable, Judge
Poole, dissented from the en bane decision. Apparently, Judge Poole changed his mind and rejected the
nonjusticiability argument and concluded that hanging is a cruel and unusual method of excution. See
Campbell v. Wood, 18 F-3d 662, 729 (9th Cir. 1994) (Poole, J., dissenting).
184. Campbell, 18 F3d at 680 (citing Dear Wing Jung v. United States, 312 F.2d 73, 75-76 (9th Cir.
1962). The court also referred to the probation choice cases. See Id at 680-81 (citing United States v.
Terrigno, 838 F.2d 371, 374 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 264
(9th Cir. 1975)).
185. See id The court found no error in the district court's findings that "the risk of death by de-
capitation was negligible, and that hanging according to the protocol does not involve lingering death,
mutilation, or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Id. The dissent disagreed, arguing that
the district court's findings were clearly contrary to the evidence at the hearing:
The evidence at the hearing left no doubt that hanging entails a risk of slow, painful stran-
gulation. This risk has existed under all hanging protocols used throughout history, and it Is
simply fanciful, or worse, to conclude that the Washington protocol, which is substantially
the same as these procedures, will eliminate this risk.
Id. at 711 (Reinhardt, J., concurring and dissenting). In conclusion, Judge Reinhardt stated, "Until we
reverse today's decision, our circuit will have a blotch on its reputation that will be a constant embar-
rassment to us all." Id. at 717. As noted earlier, in Campbell, the dissent's interpretation of Supreme
Court precedent regarding the use of objective factors seems more consistent with Supreme Court
precedent than the majority's view. See supra note 116.
186. 117 F.3d 1094, 1104-05 (9th Cir. 1997), superceding, Poland v. Stewart, 104 F.3d 1099, 1996
WL 764695, * 11-12 (9th Cir. 1996), amending, Poland v. Stewart, 92 F.3d 881,891-92 (9th Cir. 1996).
187. See Poland, 92 F.3d at 891-92; Poland, 104 F.3d 1099, 1996 WL 764695 at *11-12.
188. See Poland, 117 F.3d at 1104. See also LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1264 (9th Cir.
1998) (holding that Walter LaGrand's challenge to lethal gas was not ripe until he selected that method
of execution).
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panel of the Ninth Circuit held in LaGrand v. Stewart'89 that a defendant's
voluntary choice of lethal gas did not waive his claim that the use of lethal
gas violates the Eighth Amendment."g Arizona has a death penalty statute
where lethal injection is the default method,"' and in LaGrand, the defen-
dant had chosen lethal gas."9 The court noted that "the law of the circuit"
is that "Eighth Amendment protections may not be waived, at least in the
area of capital punishment."'" Thus, the court went on to address the de-
fendant's challenge of lethal gas as an execution method, holding that le-
thal gas was a cruel and unusual punishment"m and enjoining the state of
Arizona from executing Karl LaGrand by that method. 9 Although the
Ninth Circuit granted Karl LaGrand a stay of execution on the gas chamber
issue,'96 the Supreme Court subsequently vacated the stay without com-
ment.'" Mr. LaGrand was allowed to change his execution method at the
last minute,198 and he was executed by lethal injection. 9
Almost immediately, however, the issue arose again when Karl's
brother, Walter, was scheduled to be executed, and he also chose lethal gas
as his method of execution. After the Ninth Circuit court restrained and
enjoined the State of Arizona from executing Walter by lethal gas, the
Supreme Court granted the state's petition for writ of certiorari and vacated
189. 173 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 119 S. Ct. 1018 (1999).
190. See id at 1148.
191. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-704(B) (1998).
192. See LaGrand 173 F.3dat 1149.
193. Id at 1148.
194. See id at 1148-49. The court based its holding regarding the constitutionality of lethal gas on
the facts found by the California district court in Ferro v. Gomze, 865 F. Supp. 1387, 1404 (N.D. Cal.
1994), after an eight-day bench trial. See LaGrand, 173 F.3d at 1148-49.
An inmate [m the gas chamber] probably remains conscious anywhere from 15 seconds to
one minute, and there is a substantial likelihood that consciousness, or a wxing and waning
of consciousness, persists for several additional minutes. During this time, inmaes suffer
intense, visceral pain, primarily as a result of lack of oxygen to the cells. The experience of
'air hunger' is akin to the experience of a major heart attack, or to being held under water.
Other possible effects of the cyanide gas include tetany, an exquisitely panful contraction of
the muscles, and painful build-up of lactic acid and adrenaline. Cyanide-induced cellular
suffocation causes anxiety, panic, terror and pain.
Id (quoting Fierro 11, 77 F3d 301, 308 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Fero, 865 F. Supp. at 1404)).
195. Seeid at l149.
196. See id
197. See Stewart v. (Karl) LaGrand, 119 S. Ct. 1107 (1999). Apparently, the case name is listed
wrong because it lists the defendant as "Terry -linze LaGrand" instead of "Karl Hinze LaGrand" (the
first name of the petitioner in the case was "Terry"). See Id Justice Stevens dissented from the order
vacating the stay, arguing that the Court should address, Inter alia, the issue ofw -ether an inmate -ho
chooses to be executed by lethal gas waives his right to argue that lethal gas is unconstitutional. See Id
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
198. See Stewart v. (Walter) LaGrand, 119 S.Ct. 1018, 1020 (1999).
199. See Cohen, supra note 11, at A14. At the last minute, the state once again gave Karl LaGrand
the option to select his execution method, and that time he chose lethal injection. See Id
200. See (Walter) LaGrand 119 S. Ct. at 1020.
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the injunction."' Thus, Walter LaGrand was executed in Arizona's gas
chamber on March 3, 199 9."0
The following is the Supreme Court's complete analysis in LaGrand of
whether a capital defendant may consent to be executed by an otherwise
unconstitutional method of execution:
By declaring his method of execution, picking lethal gas over the
state's default form of execution-lethal injection-Walter La-
Grand has waived any objection he might have to it. See e.g.,
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed.
1461 (1938). To hold otherwise, and to hold that Eighth Amend-
ment protections cannot be waived in the capital context, would
create and apply a new procedural rule in violation of Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989).203
Additionally, the Court found that the gas issue was procedurally defaulted
because Walter LaGrand did not raise the issue on direct appeal.
20 4
Not only was the Court's analysis of the merits of the issue cursory,
but, as Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent, the issue did not receive full
briefing and argument before the Court.20 5 Perhaps the Court devoted little
effort to the issue because of the time constraints dictated by Walter La-
Grand's execution, which was scheduled for only hours after the Court's
decision.2" Another reason that the Court may not have analyzed the issue
sufficiently is because the analysis and conclusion are dicta because of the
Court's conclusion that the issue was procedurally defaulted.2" 7
The Court's analysis of the merits of the issue is interesting, in part,
because of the authority the Court relied upon. First, the Court cited John-
son v. Zerbst,08 which did not involve the Eighth Amendment but was a
Sixth Amendment case. Further, because LaGrand came to the Court on
habeas, the Court cited Teague v. Lane'" for the proposition that even if
the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments
201. See id.
202. See Cohen, supra note 11, at A14.
203. (Walter) LaGrand, 119 S. Ct. at 1020.
204. See id The Court also held that Walter LaGrand failed to show cause to overcome the bar
because there was sufficient debate about the constitutionality of execution by gas at the time of La-
Grand's appeal. See Id The Ninth Circuit had found cause and prejudice to excuse the default. See
id
205. See id at 1021 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
206. See Reuters, Arizona Puts 2nd German Citizen to Death, THE ORLANDO (FLA.) SENTINEL,
March 4, 1999, at A4, available in LEXIS, News Library, Orsent File.
207. See (Walter) LaGrand, 119 S. Ct. at 1021.
208. 304 U.S. 458, 459 (1938). In Johnson, the Court held that the habeas petitioner was entitled to
relief if he could show that the petitioner did not competently and intelligently waive his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. See id at 468-69.
209. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Under Teague, new rules do not apply to habeas petitioners. See Id at
309-10.
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could not be waived in the capital context, such a ruling would not benefit
LaGrand because it would be a new rule?'0 Under Teague, except for two
exceptions, a defendant may not benefit from a "new rule" of law in federal
habeas corpus proceedings if the new rule was announced after the defen-
dant's conviction became final" In its cursory analysis, the Court seemed
to ignore the fact that a "new rule" could have applied to LaGrand if one of
the Teague exceptions applied 2 Further, because Johnson was not di-
rectly on point and because Dear Wing Jung was decided in 1962 consis-
tently with LaGrand's position, arguably, Walter LaGrand was not even
asking for a "new rule."2 3
Beside the facts that the Court used cursory reasoning and did not cite
a case that was directly on point, it ignored the reasoning used by the lower
courts that had addressed the issue. This lack of analysis is somewhat sur-
prising considering that most of the lower court decisions supported a con-
trary conclusion and that, prior to LaGrand, commentators seemed to as-
sume that an unconstitutional punishment could not be used even if a de-
fendant consented 1
Perhaps, however, the Court opted not to wrestle with this complex is-
sue because it could base its decision on the procedural default issue and
on the Teague procedural issue. In this respect, the Court indicated that it
could reach a different result if a case were to reach the Court on a certio-
210. See (Walter) LaGrand, 119 S. Ct. at 1020. The Supreme Court first held that Teague applied to
capital cases in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,313-14 (1989).
211. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 310. See also O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 157-59 (1997)
(holding that a requirement for ajury instruction in capital cases regarding parole eligibility was a "new
rule').
212. Arguably, Walter LaGrand's case could fit within the firt exception. See Teague, 489 U.S. at
311-14. Liebman and Hertz explain the two exceptions as follows:
The first exception permits retroactive application of new rules that "placeD 'certain kinds
of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making
authority to proscribe'" including "rules forbidding criminal punishment of certain primay
conduct [and] ... rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defen-
dants because of their status or offense." The second exception permits retroactive epplica-
tion of new rules that "requirel the observance of'those procedures that... are 'implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty.'"
JAMES S. LtEBMAN & RANDY HERTz, 2 FEDERAL HABEAS CoRpus PRACriCE AND PROCEDURE 934-35
(3rd ed. 1998) (citations omitted). The Court's failure to even address the exceptions illustatmes thz
inadequate treatment given to the issue.
213. See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text. However, if Dear WlingJung w not dictated
by Supreme Court precedent, then LaGrand was asking for a new rule.
214. Although this issue previously has not been addressed extensively, some commentators have
briefly made note of the issue and assumed that the Eighth Amendment cannot be waived in this con-
text See Blum, supra note 15, at 451 (COne may not consent to cruel and unusual punishment. For
example, even if given the choice of punishments between torture and death, the prisoner could not
choose tortur."); Richard W. Garnett, Why Informed Consent? Human Experlmentatlon and the
Ethics of Autonomy, 36 CATiL LAw. 455, 501 (1996) (rNo defendant could ever meaningfully consent
to an Eighth. Amendment violation; after all, who is he to demand that we violate our moral
commitments.). But see Beckman, supra note 2, at 893 (arguing that convicted paraphillics should be
allowed to waive constitutional protections to receive chemical castration treatment).
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rari grant from a direct appeal rather than from habeas review and if the
issue were not defaulted.215 Thus, the LaGrand opinion failed to fully re-
solve the choice issue, and it remains open until the Court addresses the
issue in a different procedural posture
1 6
IV. THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT BAN ON CRUEL
AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS DOES NoT PERMIT
WAIVER BY INDIVIDUALS
There are three reasons why the Constitution does not allow defendants
to waive the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment.2t7
First, the Supreme Court's own Eighth Amendment analysis indicates a
strong societal interest in the ban on cruel and unusual punishments that
should not be waived by one individual. Second, such Eighth Amendment
waivers should not be permitted because they differ significantly from
waivers of other constitutional rights since such Eighth Amendment waiv-
ers, unlike other constitutional waivers, provide no benefits and are a det-
riment to society. Third, allowing such waivers and allowing any punish-
ment as a choice would lead to absurd results and deprive the Eighth
Amendment of meaning.
A. Supreme Court Precedent Reveals a Societal Interest in the Eighth
Amendment That Should Not Be Waived by an Individual
As discussed above, the Court has consistently allowed certain consti-
tutional rights to be waived by criminal defendants. Although the Court
215. This outcome, however, puts state capital defendants in a Catch 22. Arguably, afler a capital
defendant's direct appeal, the choice of execution issue likely will not be ripe for review because exe-
cution is not imminent because of the availability of habeas review and because, at that point, the
defendant likely will not have had to choose an execution method. Then, after habeas review when the
choice issue is ripe, the defendant cannot win because the Court would then have to apply a "new rule."
216. Arguably, however, if Eighth Amendment protections cannot be waived, then Teague should
not prevent the Court from considering Eighth Amendment arguments.
217. Initially, in considering waiver, there is an issue of whether a criminal defendant selecting
certain punishments, such as the means of death, can ever really make a "knowing, voluntary and
intelligent" waiver. The choice situation has an element of coercion, and many defendants may not be
able to make such a "free" choice. For example, several studies indicate that a large proportion of
capital defendants are brain damaged, mentally ill, mentally retarded and/or victims of childhood abuse.
Such defendants may never be able to "knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently" make such a choice.
See Michael Mello & Donna Duffy, Suspending Justice: The Unconstitutionality of the Proposed Six.
Month Time Limit on the Filing of Habeas Corpus Petitions by State Death Row Inmates, 18 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 451,481-84 (1990-91) (discussing reports and noting that "many condemned
inmates are illiterate, uneducated, mentally impaired, or any combination of all three"); Welsh S,
White, Effective Assistance of Counsel In Capital Cases: The Evolving Standard of Care, 1993 U. ILL.
L. REV. 323, 338-39 (1993) (noting various studies and reports indicating a significant number of
capital defendants with mental retardation or mental diseases). See generally DOROTHY OTNOW
LEwis, M.D., GUILTY BY REASON OF INSANITY: A PSYCHIATRIST EXPLORES THE MINDS OF KILLERS
(1998). This coercion issue, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
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has held that certain constitutional rights may be waived by criminal de-
fendants, it does not necessarily follow that a defendant may waive the
right not to be subjected to a cruel and unusual punishment. As noted
above, in an execution volunteer case, Lenhard v. Wolff,2 8 Justice Marshall
wrote a dissent that questioned the constitutionality of Eighth Amendment
waivers. Justice Marshall argued that the Eighth Amendment not only
protects individuals, "'it also expresses a fundamental interest of society in
ensuring that state authority is not used to administer barbaric punish-
ments."'219 Therefore, he argued, society's interests in the ban on cruel and
unusual punishments cannot be overridden by a defendant's waiver"
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and WThite expressed similar concerns in
Whitmore v. Arkansas.
The problem with this argument, however, is that society has an inter-
est in all rights in the Bill of Rights being enforced, and Justice Marshall's
argument could mean that defendants could not waive other rights, like the
right to a jury trial. Actually, Justice Harlan made a similar argument in
1883 in Hopt v. Utah m regarding the right of a defendant to be present at
trial. In that case, Justice Harlan stated "which the law makes essential
in proceedings involving the deprivation of life or liberty cannot be dis-
pensed with, or affected by the consent of the accused."'' Since then,
however, the Court has held in numerous cases that certain constitutional
rights may be waived. This Article does not argue that all of those cases
should be overruled;' the question is whether this Eighth Amendment
right differs from those other constitutional rights.
The Supreme Court's own Eighth Amendment analysis provides a sig-
nificant reason why waiver should not apply in the context of the applica-
tion of the Eighth Amendment to barbaric punishments. Unlike the analy-
sis used regarding other rights, the Eighth Amendment analysis used by the
Court to evaluate each punishment is based, in large part, on current socie-
tal standards, illustrating the public's interest in the Eighth Amendment.'
As discussed above, the Supreme Court looks to both objective and
subjective factors in determining whether a punishment violates the Eighth
218. 444 U.S. 807 (1979).
219. Id at 811 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1976)).
220. See i. at 811-12.
221. 495 U.S. 149,171-76 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
222. 110 U.S. 574 (1884) (holding that defendant's failure to object did not waive objection to
proceedings that occurred outside his presence), overruled by Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442,458
(1912) (rejecting the Hopi statement that a trial can never continue in a defendant's absencc).
223. See id at 578-79.
224. Id at 579. But see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938) (setting out standards for
waiver of the right to counsel).
225. See, e.g., Johnson, 304 U.S. at 462.
226. The question of whether the Court should hold that any other constitutional criminal rights
cannot be waived is beyond the scope of this Article.
227. See discussion upra Part HI.B.
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Amendment. 2  In Weems, the Court looked at contemporary standards to
strike down the punishment of hard and painful labor for document falsifi-
cation. 9 There, the Court stated that the Eighth Amendment "may acquire
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice. '
In Trop, the Court struck down denationalization as a punishment in part
because it was a rare form of punishment in today's "international commu-
nity of democracies."' There, the Court said the Amendment "must draw
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society. '32 The Court has continued to rely upon objective
societal standards as it has addressed the death penalty in cases beginning
with Furman and Gregg.3 For example, in Gregg, a plurality stated that
the cruel and unusual punishment clause requires courts to examine "ob-
jective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction." '
The same analysis has continued in subsequent cases,"s and the Justices
continue to evaluate the "national consensus" 6 from such indicators as
legislative enactments and jury verdicts in interpreting the Eighth Amend-
ment.2 7
This reliance on objective factors in Eighth Amendment analysis cre-
ates a mandate from the Court that permitted punishments must reflect our
contemporary society. The Court has indicated an overall community con-
cern with the types of punishments society inflicts by using such terms as
"public attitude,"238 "national consensus, '  "human dignity,"" and "hu-
mane justice.""24 Additionally, the use of the term "unusual" in the Eighth
228. See discussion supra Part HLI.B.
229. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,378 (1910).
230. Id
231. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958).
232. Id at 101.
233. See discussion supra Part II.B.
234. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
235. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-77 (1989) (examining state statutes and
cases allowing juveniles to be sentenced to death); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334-40 (1989)
(examining whether there is objective evidence of an emerging national consensus against execution of
the mentally retarded); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821-31 (1988) (examining state statutes,
jury decisions, the American Bar Association's position, and other countries in evaluating the applica-
tion of the death penalty to 15-year-old defendant); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 141, 152-55 (1987)
(examining legislative judgments and jury decisions in evaluating the use of the death penalty where
felony-murder defendant did not kill); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 787, 789-96 (1982) (same);
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592-96 (1977) (examining legislative judgments regarding the appli-
cation of the death penalty to defendants convicted of rape).
236. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 334-40 (examining whether there is objective evidence of an emerging
"national consensus" against execution of the mentally retarded).
237. See supra notes 82-83, 92-93 and accompanying text.
238. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
239. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 334-40.
240. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182. Terms such as "human dignity" are used by the Court in the con-
text of evaluating subjective factors, but they also reflect a societal concern.
241. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,378 (1910).
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Amendment itself indicates a concern with punishments that are out of the
ordinary from contemporary society. This requirement that the Eighth
Amendment comply with today's world illustrates a societal interest be-
yond that of other rights whose main focus is on the protection of individu-
als 42 Thus, the Eighth Amendment is unique243 in that it protects the in-
terests of contemporary society, and an individual should not be able to
waive that protection from barbaric punishments.2 "
The Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishments has a
societal base that is more comparable to some constitutional rights than to
others. For example, First Amendment rights are society based, so the
Court would likely hold that a criminal defendant could not waive First
Amendment rights if a judge were to give the defendant the options of
prison or attending the judge's church every week. Societal interests in the
separation of church and state would prevent a defendant from electing to
go to the judge's church even if the defendant "waived" the right to object
by choosing that option over prison. Indeed, several courts have held that
such sentences are unconstitutional." The ban on cruel and unusual pun-
242. However, also in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment and the incorporation debate, the
Court has looked at the effects of time: "Representing as it does a living principle, due process is not
confined within a permanent catalogue of wAiat may at a given time be deerned the limits or the essen-
tials of fundamental rights." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949). Outside the criminal justice
context, the Court has also affirmed that the meaning of the constitution is not static. See, e.g, Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (incorporating consideration of modem technology in determining
when a fetus becomes viable). Still, in the criminal justice area, the Eighth Amendment is unique in
requiring an analysis of society's current views in interpreting the meaning of "cruel and unusual." The
meaning of the phrase can, theoretically, change in a very short time, depending on societal change. If,
for example, within the next few years, every state except forTexas were to get rid of the death penalty,
in the face of such a "national consensus," the Court could hold that the death penalty violates the
Eighth Amendment.
243. It has been argued that other Constitutional amendments protect the rights of others besides the
accused. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 VA. L REv. 761, 779
(1989) ("Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights might be seen as protecting primarily persons other
than those who claim their protection in criminal cases."). The Supreme Court has said that the right to
ajury trial is a right not only of the accused, but of the government See Singer v. United Staes, 380
U.S. 24,36 (1965). Thus, it does not violate the Constitution to require the government's and Court's
concurrence in a waiver. See id at 36-37. Certainly other amendments protect other interests beyond
that of the individual defendant. However, as discussed above, the Eighth Amendment is unique in that
waiver of the ban on "cruel and unusual" punishments never benefits society, and it is unique in the
extent to which the Court relies upon contemporary standards for interpreting the Eighth AmendmenL
244. The focus of this Article is on the Eighth Amendment's protections against torturous or dispro-
portionate punishments. Therefore, a discussion of whether the unique qualities of the Eighth Amend-
ment should also mean that Eighth Amendment procedural rights should also be unwaivable is beyond
the scope of this Article. Arguably, such procedural rights are distinguishable from other Eighth
Amendment rights. However, Eighth Amendment interests in prohibiting the arbitrary use of the death
penalty supports the argument that those rights should not be waivable either. See Carter, supra note
136, at 127-29 (arguing that Eighth Amendment prohibits defendants from waiving their rights to
present mitigating evidence and to appeal).
245. See Kerr v. Famey, 95 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 1996) (requiring an inmate to attend religion-based
narcotics rehabilitation meetings violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment); State v.
Evans, 796 P.2d 178, 179-80 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that probation condition requiring church
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ishments, as well as the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, are
unique because they help "define who we are as a nation. 246 Here, how-
ever, such an analysis of every constitutional right is beyond the scope of
this Article. For present purposes, it is enough to distinguish the Eighth
Amendment right from other constitutional criminal rights where the Court
does permit waiver. As discussed above, the Eighth Amendment right
differs significantly from those other rights, and therefore, waiver should
not be allowed in this context.
B. Eighth Amendment Waiver Differs from Other Constitutional Waivers
Not only does the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual pun-
ishments differ from other constitutional criminal rights under current Su-
preme Court cases, but as a practical matter, waiver of such Eighth
Amendment rights differs significantly from the waiver of other criminal
rights. Obviously, both types of rights are important, but the effects of
these waivers differ in important ways.
The justification for disallowing waiver of constitutional rights applies
with more force where the issue involves a barbaric punishment instead of
a procedural violation. First, unlike the choice of punishment context, a
defendant may benefit from waiving certain other rights, like the right to a
jury trial.247 Further, society actually benefits by allowing defendants to
waive their trial rights. As one commentator noted, plea-bargains play an
important role in our criminal justice system, and, thus, "[i]t is waiver of
rights that permits the system of criminal justice to work at all." '248 Another
attendance at a specific church and 1,000 hours of maintenance at that church violated the Free Exer-
cise Clause of the First Amendment); State v. Morgan, 459 So. 2d 6, 10 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (holding
that a condition of probation that the defendant regularly attend an organized church of his choice
violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment); Griffin v. Coughlin, 673 N.E.d 98, 111
(N.Y. 1996) (holding that prison's requirement that in order to qualify for a family reunion program the
petitioner must participate in a treatment program that incorporates religious aspects violates the Estab-
lishment Clause of the First Amendment); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 38 S.E.2d 444,448-49 (Va. 1946)
(holding that a probation condition for delinquent boys requiring them to attend Sunday school and
church violates the First Amendment); cf Wamerv. Orange County Dep't of Probation, 115 F.3d 1068,
1075 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that a probation condition that the petitioner attend Alcoholics Anony-
mous violated the First Amendment establishment clause, but noting that the condition might be con-
stitutional if the petitioner were given other options); In re Quirk, 705 So. 2d 172, 182 (La. 1997) (In a
judiciary proceeding, noting that the law is not clear on the issue of whether ajudge may make, or offer
as an alternative, church attendance as a condition of probation).
246. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1405 (1986).
247. For example, defendants gain some benefits when they waive their right to a jury trial: their
case is resolved quickly and without the uncertainty of ajury verdict. However, it is difficult to argue
that a defendant, who may be mentally ill, benefits from selecting a cruel punishment.
248. Tigar, supra note 125, at 8. Professor Tigar comments further.
In reality, in most criminal cases, perhaps as many as ninety percent in some jurisdictions,
the model [of a complete fair trial] has no direct relevance to real life, since the defendant
cuts short the process by pleading guilty to the offense charged or some lesser included of-
fense. Other defendants shorten the process by waiving a jury trial, or by falling to raise
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commentator has argued that allowing waiver of Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendment rights makes sense if one views waiver as not harming the
people those rights were designed to protect 49 Thus, as a practical matter,
waiver of other constitutional rights offers societal and individual benefits
that are not present in the torturous punishment waiver context, 0
In addition to the consideration of waiver benefits, another reason that
waiver should not apply in the brutal punishment context is because such a
waiver is more detrimental to society than other constitutional criminal
right waivers. Allowing a government to impose a particularly brutal pun-
ishment has a more substantial detrimental effect upon society than a de-
fendant waiving his right to appeal or a right to an attorney. An individual
who consents to have his house searched does not hurt society to the de-
gree that a brutal punishment does.
The government's use of a brutal punishment, however, would harm
society more greatly. There have been various studies that illustrate the
harmful effects of even typical executions on the public, and there is evi-
dence that executions can have a detrimental effect on society by actually
increasing crime For example, historically, public executions had a
possible defenses on procedural and technical grounds. Criminal courts are crowded now,
imagine their utter breakdown in the wake of every defendant insisting on a plenary trial.
Id.
249. See Stuntz, supra note 243, at 779. Professor Stuntz argues that Fourth, Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights may be seen as primarily protecting persons other than those claiming those rights.
See id at 779. Professor Stuntz argues further
Once one accepts this view of the relevant rights, waiver doctrines that permit pollce to take
advantage of defendants' mistakes, and even to engage in active deception, may make fairly
good sense. If the rights themselves seek to protect the interests of third parties rather than
the interests of the defendants asserting them, then one would expect waiver doctrine to turn
on a series of differentiation problems, protecting unworthy defendants when, but only
when, they could not be separated from the rights' intended beneficiaries.
Id at 767.
250. One may argue that Gary Gilmore did not benefit from waiving his appeals because he may
have obtained relief on appeal. However, arguably, a capital defendant whose execution is inevitable
may benefit from a speedier execution to avoid the prolonged terror of waiting to be killed. See Lackey
v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1045-47 (1995) (Stevens, J., memorandum respecting denial of certiorari)
(discussing merits of argument that a prolonged stay on death row constitutes a cruel and unusual
punishment); In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 172 (1890) (noting that "when a prisoner sentenced by a
court to death is confined in the penitentiary awaiting the execution of the sentence, one of the most
horrible feelings to which he can be subjected during that time is the uncertainty during the whole of
it"). Of course, such a conclusion assumes that such a defendant would know when the execution is
inevitable and is capable of making a knowing and voluntary waiver. See discussion mpra note 214.
On the other hand, though a masochist might disagree, it is difficult to argue that one obtains
any benefit from being tortured to death instead of being killed in a less painful way. Still, assuming
surgical castration is an unconstitutional punishment, reasonable minds may disagree as to whether
society benefits from providing the option of castration to repeat sex offenders.
251. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment does not require a consent
search to be "knowing and intelligent." See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 US. 218, 237, 241
(1973).
252. "In 1980, two sociologists, William Bowers and Glenn Pierce, did a study going right b=ak to
1907. They found that in New York, within a thirty-day period following every execution, between
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harmful effect on the public, sometimes resulting in riots." By the late
1820s in the United States, essayists argued for private executions to re-
place public hangings. 4 "Legislators, editors, ministers, and merchants
decried public hangings as festivals of disorder that subverted morals, in-
creased crimes, excited sympathy with the criminal, and wasted time." '
One writer stated that "'a hundred persons are made worse, where one is
made better by public execution.',1 6  Today, the general public is pro-
tected from the sight of executions."5 Still, some people are still directly
touched by executions, such as the judicial and executive decision-makers,
the crime victim's family, the defendant's family, prison guards, reporters,
lawyers, and the executioner."8 The horrors of an especially torturous
1907 and 1963, there were two or three murders over and above the expected rate." Michael Kroll, The
Write Stuff, in A PUNISHMENT IN SEARCH OF A CRIME 299,302 (Ian Grey & Moira Stanley eds., 1989).
George Bernard Shaw explained, "It is the deed that teaches, not the name we give it. Murder and
capital punishment are not opposites that cancel one another, but similars that breed their kind."
GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, MAN AND SUPERMAN 232 (1903).
Albert Camus wrote about the guillotine:
Let us be frank about the penalty which can have no publicity, that intimidation which works
only on respectable people, so long as they are respectable, which fascinates those who have
ceased to be respectable and debases or deranges those who take part in it. It is a penalty, to
be sure, a frightful torture, both physical and moral, but it provides no sure example except a
demoralizing one. It punishes, but it forestalls nothing; indeed it may even arouse the im-
pulse to murder.
Albert Camus, Re/lections on the Guillotine, In RESISTANCE, REBELLION AND DEATH 174, 197 (Alfred
A. Knoff, 1961). Camus also noted, "Statistics drawn up at the beginning of the century In England
show that out of250 who were hanged, 170 had previously attended one or more executions, And in
1886, out of 167 condemned men who had gone through the Bristol prison, 164 had witnessed at least
one execution." Id at 189.
253. See, e.g., Louis P. MASuR, RITES OF EXECUTION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE 93-116 (Oxford University Press 1989).
254. See idat 95.
255. Id.
256. Id (quoting ESCRIToR, Dec. 1, 1826, at 359). Another commentator wrote:
Executions in the times when they were universally public, were occasions for rioting, revelry
and ribaldry, and seldom was the demeanour of the crowd decorous in the face of death. And
seldom, too, did a public execution act as a deterrent. More often than not in the crowd
would be friends of the criminal who had escaped by the merest accident being in his place
and who, the very next day, would continue their criminal practices for which they had
watched one of their number hang. In many accounts of the Tybum and Newgate hangings
one reads that pickpockets plied their trade busily among the crowd. It was considered the
proper thing to be present at an important execution.
JOHN LAURENCE, A HISTORY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 183 (1960).
257. "However many die, privacy is likely to remain the pre-eminent feature of executions, So
powerful still is the belief that the public should be prevented from observing the execution, even
television, which daily brings quivering images ofsanitized death into the family room, is not permitted
to broadcast the affair." MASUR, supra note 253, at 162.
258. See, e.g., EDMUND BROWN, PUBLIC JUSTICE, PRIVATE MERCY: A GOVERNOR'S EDUCATION ON
DEATH Row 163 (1989). Former Governor Brown, who oversaw many executions, wrote:
[The longer I live, the larger loom those fifty-nine decisions about justice and mercy that I
had to make as governor. They didn't make me feel godlike then: far from it; I felt just the
opposite. It was an awesome, ultimate power over the lives of others that no person or gov-
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killing would affect those people. Further the public still reads and hears
reports about executions, and if people were to read about a defendant be-
ing boiled in oil, there would probably be some detrimental societal effects.
For example, Americans who read about the July 1999 electric chair exe-
cution of Allen Davis-where blood gushed from his mask and oozed
through his chest strap-may think less of themselves and their govern-
ment.a 9
Such societal concerns about brutal punishments have been expressed
by others. During a debate about capital punishment in the House of Lords
in England, Lord Chancellor Gardiner stated:
When we abolished the punishment for treason that you should be
hanged, and then cut down while still alive, and then disembow-
elled while still alive, and then quartered, we did not abolish that
punishment because we sympathized with traitors, but because we
took the view that it was a punishment no longer consistent with
our self respect.'
The detriments of such Eighth Amendment waivers should be consid-
ered in the Court's Eighth Amendment analysis. As the Court has stated,
"While the State has the power to punish, the [Eighth] Amendment stands
to assure that the power be exercised within the limits of civilized stan-
dards."'
Thus, the difference between the waiver of the ban on cruel and un-
usual punishments and the waiver of other rights given to defendants by
other constitutional amendments is that the waiver of those other rights, in
general, provides a benefit to defendants and to society, so the constitution
should allow such waivers. In the Eighth Amendment context, there is
generally no benefit for defendants or society in allowing defendants to be
punished in a cruel and unusual manner. In fact, such punishments would
have a detrimental effect on society. Therefore, the Court should not per-
mit waivers of such Eighth Amendment rights, as it does for other consti-
eminent should have, or crave. And looking back over their names and files now, despite
the horrible crimes and the catalog of human weaknesses they compris, I realize that each
decision took something out of me that nothing-not family or work or hope for the
future-has ever been able to replace.
Id
259. See Mike Schneider, Electric Chair Faces New Challenge: Lau)iyr Savs It's Cruel, Unusual,
SuN-SENTm, July 28, 1999, at 6B, available In LEXIS, Ncw Library, Sunsen File (reporting that
during Davis' execution, "blood gushed from the mask covering his face, poured over his collar and
chest, then oozed through the buckle holes on the chest strap holding him in the oaken chair").
260. People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 899 (Cal. 1972) (quoting 268 HAsARD, PARL DEi. H.L
703 (5th ser.1965)). See, e.g., Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 701 (9th Cir. 1994) (Rehdt, .,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("We reject barbaric forms of punishment as cnx1l amd un-
usual not merely because of the pain they inflict but also becaus we pride ourselves on being a civi-
lized society.").
261. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
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tutional criminal rights.
C. Logic Dictates that Such Eighth Amendment Waivers Should Not Be
Permitted
The problems with holding that a defendant may waive the ban on
cruel and unusual punishments are best illustrated by some specific exam-
pies. If a rape defendant may waive his Eighth Amendment rights and be
castrated in exchange for a lighter prison sentence, courts could allow
thieves to have their hands chopped off and Peeping Toms to have their
eyes gouged out. In order to raise some money for the state treasury and a
victim's family, the government could pass a bill allowing capital defen-
dants a monetary bonus if they choose-over lethal injection-public exe-
cution by guillotine in a coliseum before a paid audience.
Further, if, as the Court implies in LaGrand, Johnson permits Eighth
Amendment waivers, then rape defendants, child defendants, and insane
defendants could choose the death penalty even though the Court has held
that it violates the Eighth Amendment to execute those categories of de-
fendants.262 To go further, if the Court were to eventually hold that the
death penalty itself is a cruel and unusual punishment, defendants would
still be able to choose that punishment as an option over prison. Perhaps a
new Court TV show could be developed along the lines of the old Let's
Make a Deal show, with defendants choosing among various punishment
options, such as a one-year prison sentence or "what's behind Curtain
Number Two." As long as defendants are given constitutional options, any
punishment would be constitutional when reformed through the power of
choice.
These absurd situations could result from the reasoning of the LaGrand
opinion. Yet, it is difficult to believe that the Court would actually permit
deals such as a minor consenting to being executed. The Court must draw
the line somewhere and prevent some Eighth Amendment waivers. Be-
cause of the strong societal interests in preventing the use of barbaric pun-
ishments and because such Eighth Amendment waivers harm society, the
Court should draw the line in a way that does not allow defendants to elect
to be punished in a cruel and unusual manner.
Hopefully, we will continue to live in a society where such deals are
not made. Yet, the purpose of the Constitution-and the Eighth Amend-
262. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (holding that it is unconstitutional to
execute defendants under 16 years old); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,417-18 (1986) (holding that
it violates the Constitution to execute the insane); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (holding
that it is unconstitutional to execute a defendant for rape). Indeed, it appears unlikely that the Court
would allow a child to waive the Eighth Amendment protection in this context. The torturous punish-
ment context seems more similar to the bans on executed children and the insane, where waiver would
probably not be allowed, than in the context of a volunteer who is permitted to waive the Eighth
Amendment right to protect mitigating evidence.
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ment in particular-is to guarantee that such punishments never occur in
today's society. Because the Eighth Amendment protects societal interests
regarding the method of execution, that protection cannot be waived by an
individual.
V. CONCLUSION
The punishment choice issue has not come up very often, probably
because once a defendant selects a punishment, that defendant is unlikely
to challenge its constitutionality. In LaGrand, the issue apparently arose
because the defendants chose the gas chamber so that they could raise the
issue that it was a cruel and unusual punishment ' Perhaps the Court
viewed this strategy as a lawyer tactic to delay the executions and thus, that
may be why the Court disposed of the issue without much discussion. Yet,
there are important societal interests at stake that the Court should address.
Perhaps nothing reflects a society more than the punishments it im-
poses on the most despised." A review of world history illustrates the
gradual development of society's views of appropriate punishments. In the
United States, we believe that today we are more enlightened than our an-
cestors because we no longer permit punishments such as beheading, cruci-
fixion, burning alive, starvation in dungeons, or "tearing to death by red-
hot pincers." It is illogical to assume only that we are more enlightened
than our predecessors but not that our descendants will likely be more en-
lightened than us. Thus, when evaluating the constitutionality of a pun-
ishment, the Court has made provisions for considering our development
toward a more enlightened society.
The intimate relationship between the Eighth Amendment and our
"evolving standards '  and "public attitude!' requires the Court to con-
tinue to recognize the societal interest in the ban on cruel and unusual
punishments. The Eighth Amendment requires that the awesome power to
punish is "exercised within the limits of civilized standards,"'  and per-
mitting waiver of the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual pun-
263. See Associated Press, German Citizen Is Put to Death In Gas Chamber, CIDI. TRIB., larch 4,
1999, at 5, available in LEXIS, News Library, Chtrib File ('Both brothers choe the gas chamber in
hopes that courts would rule the method cruel and unusual and therefore unconstitutional.").
264. "The mood and temper of the public with regard to the treatment of crime and criminals Is one
of the most unfailing tests of the civilization of any country." Winston Churchill, 1910, quo'zd In
PETERN. WALKER, PUNISHmENr AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY H (1973).
265. LAURENCE, stpra note 256, at 2. Perhaps one of the more interesting punishments of ancient
times was the Roman punishment for parricides. "They were thrown into the water in a sack wich
contained also a dog, a cock, a viper and an ape. This superstitious form of punishment persisted, in
some countries, into the Middle Ages." IM/ at 3. Under the implications of LaGrand, such a punish-
ment would be constitutional as an option to prison.
266. See Trap, 356 U.S. at 101.
267. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
268. Trap, 356 U.S. at 100.
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ishments would harm society and weaken the Eighth Amendment. As a
district court judge stated, "What is at stake here is our collective right as a
civilized people not to have cruel and unusual punishment inflicted in our
name. 2
69
The Eighth Amendment protects the individual being punished, but it
also protects the rest of American society and how we view ourselves and
how the rest of the world views us. The Eighth Amendment bans cruel and
unusual punishments, and that means that citizens of the United States have
the right to live in a country that does not torture or maim its citizens.
Therefore, if the Eighth Amendment is to have any meaning, the Court
should strictly follow the demand that "nor cruel and unusual punishments
[be] inflicted,"270 even if a defendant desires such a punishment. It is our
right.
269. Franz v. Lockhart, 700 F. Supp. 1005, 1024-25 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (addressing issue where capi-
tai defendant wanted to waive his appeal to the state supreme court).
270. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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